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THROUGH THE LENS OF INNOVATION 
MIRIT EYAL-COHEN* 
ABSTRACT 
 The legal system constantly follows the footsteps of innovation and attempts to discour-
age its migration overseas. Yet, present legal rules that inform and explain entrepreneurial 
circumstances lack a core understanding of the concept of entrepreneurship. By its nature, 
law imposes order. It provides rules, remedies, and classifications that direct behavior in a 
consistent manner. Entrepreneurship turns on the contrary. It entails making creative 
judgments about the unknown. It involves adapting to disarray. It thrives on deviation as 
opposed to traditional causation. This Article argues that these differences matter. It 
demonstrates that current laws lock entrepreneurs into inefficient legal routes. Through 
specific legal classifications, it points to significant distortionary effects. It theorizes that a 
legal culture that wishes to entice entrepreneurship is one that requires legal agents to think 
like entrepreneurs. Thereafter, it offers a bridge between law and entrepreneurship by 
providing policymakers with tools to recognize its distinctive modus operandi.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The American economy is at a critical moment in history. The af-
termath of the latest downturn reveals that we have experienced one 
the deepest recessions in recent times.1 Yet, our economy has not yet 
regained its full strength.2 Now, more than ever, there is a need for 
economic renewal and mobility.3 Entrepreneurship is essential for 
revitalization, economic growth, job creation, and technological re-
newal.4 These elements are the driving force behind improvements in 
well being and standards of living.5 Governments have long realized 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Big Business Joins Obama Effort to Aid Long-Term Unem-
ployed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/us/politics/big-
companies-join-obama-in-initiative-to-help-long-term-unemployed.html (“The challenge for 
the long-term unemployed has become especially acute as the economy struggles to recover 
from one of the deepest recessions in modern times.”); William C. Rhoden, Focus on Bonds 
Misses the Big Picture, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/02/06/sports/baseball/06rhoden.html (“At a time when the nation is in one of the 
deepest recessions in its history, when hundreds of thousands of Americans are barely 
surviving, the government is spending millions of dollars to prosecute Barry Bonds.”); 
Washington’s Tax Oracles, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 21, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052748704518904575365173477277974 (“[O]n January 1 we will enact 
one of the largest tax increases in history, coming out of one of the deepest recessions in a 
century.”); Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, GM, Chrysler Seek Billions More in Aid, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/02/17/AR2009021702510.html?sid=ST2009021702827 (“The companies said they plan 
to cut an additional 50,000 jobs worldwide, drop as many as six brands and shutter 14 
plants in an attempt to survive one of the deepest recessions in decades.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Wendy Guillies, Kauffman Foundation 2015 State of Entrepreneurship 
Address (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/resources/2015/ 
soe/2015_state_of_entrepreneurship_speech.pdf (in her speech, the Acting President and 
CEO of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation warns against thinking we have passed 
the recent recession). 
 3. Id. (“[T]he headline numbers may look good, but something isn’t right when you 
dig a little deeper. The United States doesn’t just need economic growth. We need economic 
renewal. We need renewed mobility. We need a renewed notion of shared prosperity. We 
need a renewed sense of possibility.”).  
 4. See infra Section II.B; see also Robert Cooter et al., The Importance of Law in 
Promoting Innovation and Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 1, 9-14 (2011).  
 5. See, e.g., CARL J. SCHRAMM, Preface to RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM, supra note 4 (“All economies have 
rules and institutions that govern the behavior of their actors. The rules that govern the 
U.S. economy so far have helped guide unprecedented growth and well-being.”); Andrew 
Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law—Balancing Profit Maximization and Public Access to 
Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that intellectual property 
provides for new creations including drugs, business methods, songs, and financial prod-
ucts); Justin Desautels-Stein, Pragmatic Liberalism: The Outlook of the Dead, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1041, 1076 (2014) (“[H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
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that continuous growth depends upon a vibrant society of entrepre-
neurs.6 While the current global pressure to capture entrepreneur-
ship is strong, our competitive edge is being diminished by countries 
that have developed superior ways to attract intellectual wealth.7 Ac-
cordingly, entrepreneurship warrants distinct legal attention.  
                                                                                                                  
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 22-23 (2005))); Randall S. 
Kroszner et al., Economic Organization and Competition Policy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 541, 
541 (2002) (“This period saw private sector technological advances and entrepreneurial 
innovation that fueled productivity growth and improvements in our standard of living.”); 
Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust 
Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 211-13 (1999) (discussing the relationship 
between innovation and economic growth); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of 
the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 836-37, 918 
(2003) (referring to the relationship between intellectual property, innovation, and wel-
fare); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Devel-
opments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 817 
(1999) (positing a direct connection between certain intellectual property regime and pro-
gress); Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 
229, 294 (2009) (maintaining the crucial factor for economic growth and prosperity is en-
trepreneurs that dramatically increase worker productivity and, accordingly, a nation’s 
standard of living). 
 6. For example, the Australian government has published a new agenda to encour-
age entrepreneurship by embracing risk and pursuing ideas. As part of this initiative to 
generate more high-impact start-ups and fast-growing “Gazelle” firms, the government 
addressed legal areas that relate mostly to changes to taxation and company regulation. 
These initiatives are designed to assist entrepreneurial firms to access venture capital and 
address commercial risk, such as making it easier to access crowd-sourced equity funding, 
increasing access to company losses, reforming insolvency laws, and making changes to 
legal rules for venture capital limited partnership. See Taking the Leap, NAT’L  
INNOVATION & SCI. AGENDA, http://www.innovation.gov.au/theme/taking-leap (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2016); see, e.g., SPIKE INNOVATION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIST, AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT, BOOSTING HIGH-IMPACT ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AUSTRALIA: A ROLE FOR 
UNIVERSITIES 2 (2015), http://www.chiefscientist.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Boosting-High-
Impact-Entrepreneurship.pdf (reinforcing the Australian commitment to turn great ideas 
into products and practices that help build businesses and create jobs in Australia);  
Australia Proposes Tax Reforms to Encourage Employee Share Ownership, Entrepreneur-
ship, BLOOMBERG BNA, Oct. 15, 2014; Rod McGuirk, Australia to Invest $800 Million  
in Boosting Innovation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 6, 2015, 9:47 PM), http://bigstory.ap. 
org/article/607312aa0500491196d56595c8ffd67f/australia-aims-boost-innovation-and-
entrepreneurship (announcing that the Australian government will introduce new laws to 
enable innovation and entrepreneurship).  
 7. See Nicholas Bloom et al., Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chi-
nese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, CEP Discus-
sion Paper No. 1000, 2011), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1000.pdf; see also Abigail 
Klein Leichman, Israeli Startup’s Life Sciences Labs Get an Inventory Overhaul, JEWISH 
BUS. NEWS (Dec. 28, 2015), http://jewishbusinessnews.com/2015/12/28/israeli-startups-life-
sciences-labs-get-an-inventory-overhaul/ (reporting public Israeli initiatives to “encourage[] 
innovation through entrepreneurial courses, business accelerator programs and competi-
tions”); Sterling Immigration Ltd., Canadian Startup Visa v UK Tier 1 Entrepreneur, 
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2eee06c9-837e-
430d-b4c9-3aca6911e4e8 (describing U.K. and Canadian efforts to attract prospective en-
trepreneurs through special immigration visas); The Yuan and Chinese Reform, WALL. ST. 
J. (Nov. 30, 2015, 7:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-yuan-and-chinese-reform-
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 Law plays a significantly active role in creating an environment in 
which entrepreneurs can successfully act. Lawmakers can utilize law 
to encourage entrepreneurs to create opportunities by reducing 
transaction and information costs. Law can function as a stabilizing 
force that allows private actors to contract about future market con-
ditions and reduce their uncertainty.8 It has the power to increase or 
reduce the regulatory costs of pursuing entrepreneurship.  
 Law can also impose rules that obstruct entrepreneurial opportu-
nities.9 For example, patent laws ensure that entrepreneurs retain 
control of their discoveries and entrepreneurial gains.10 They facili-
tate risk-taking by ensuring that entrepreneurs reap the benefits of 
successful speculation. Nevertheless, if taken to the extreme, patent 
laws can hamper entrepreneurship by generating monopoly positions 
over discoveries and preventing other entrepreneurs from developing 
and improving them.11  
                                                                                                                  
1448929275 (reporting that “Japan is saddled with less competitive financial companies 
that shy away from financing entrepreneurial start-ups.”); Tracking Tax Runaways, 
BLOOMBERG BLOG, http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-18/tax-runaways-
tracking-inversions.html (last updated Apr. 13, 2015) (providing an updated list of compa-
nies that effectively renounced their U.S. citizenship by adopting a legal address abroad); 
US Tech Startups Look to China for Funding, Success, CHINA DAILY, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-12/20/content_22753813.htm (last updated Dec. 
20, 2015) (reporting American startup companies competing for funding for their business 
development in China); Mahendra Ved, Rise of India’s Self-Made Billionaires, NEW 
STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 4, 2015, at 16 (“The list reflects a pluralist India. Entrepreneurship 
transcends faith, class and region.”).  
 8. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 10-11 (1956) (arguing that the law can create a 
framework of reasonable expectations within which rational decisions could be taken for 
the future). But see Christine Hurt, The High Cost of Entrepreneurship, CONGLOMERATE 
BLOG: BUS., LAW, ECON. & SOC’Y (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/01/ 
the-high-cost-of-entreprenuership.html (contending that the laws in the United States do 
more to hinder entrepreneurship than assist it). 
 9. Cf. D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law & Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1537 (2013) (“[W]e also recognize circumstances in which this 
value [entrepreneurship] has largely been absent from policy debates.”).  
 10. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark 
Kirk) (noting legal rules that “strengthen our patent system . . . bolster our global com-
petiveness”); William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1909, 1947 (2013) (noting “commentators have long recognized that patents generally 
promote innovation but undermine competition and that many patent law doctrines affect 
this tradeoff”); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and 
Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1444-45 (2013) (“[U]nlike copyright, not only can an 
owner choose not to use the invention, the owner can also sue to prevent others from using 
it (or its equivalents), even if they (re)discover the invention on their own.”). But see 
MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 11 (2008) (criti-
cizing intellectual property as an “unnecessary evil” and contending there is no evidence 
the monopoly it grants “achieves the desired purpose of increasing innovation and  
creation”). 
 11. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost ‘Art’ of the Patent System, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1397, 1398 (2015) (arguing that the loss of an “art”-based concept of the patent system 
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 Congress has frequently declared that enticing entrepreneurship 
is a fundamental value in American society.12 Yet, our laws are not 
compatible with current economic and technological advances. Recent 
literature has begun to investigate the ways in which the law can 
improve production of goods and labor expansion.13 Legal reform pro-
posals have suggested ways in which the legal system—the contents 
of specific laws, judicial doctrines, regulations, and legal processes—
can be improved to spur production and growth.14 These proposals 
                                                                                                                  
causes confusion over the proper scope and nature of the patent system, over- and under-
inclusive senses of patent eligible subject matter as well as amnesia as to the long-standing 
importance of method patents). For the definition of “monopoly” in this Article, see infra 
note 198.  
 12. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-305, 
126 Stat. 306, 315-23 (2012); 161 CONG. REC. H913 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2015) (statement of 
Rep. Rohrabacher) (describing the anticipated consequences of enacting H.R. 9 by stating 
that “[i]rreparable damage will be done to our research universities, to our inventors and 
entrepreneurs. All of these people are going to be hurt.”); 161 CONG. REC. H421-22 (daily 
ed. Jan. 20, 2015) (“I intend to protect a free and open Internet, extend its reach to every 
classroom and every community, and help folks build the fastest networks so that the next 
generation of digital innovators and entrepreneurs have the platform to keep reshaping 
our world.”); 157 CONG. REC. E10-11 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011) (statement of Rep. David Drei-
er) (“[I]nnovation and entrepreneurship [are] vital to our economic recovery.”); see also 
CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32987, LONG-TERM GROWTH OF THE U.S. 
ECONOMY: SIGNIFICANCE, DETERMINANTS, AND POLICY 15 (last updated May 25, 2006), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68789.pdf (“This infrastructure [of economic 
growth] is comprised of laws, government policies, socio-economic institutions, and cultural 
attitudes that are conducive to the entrepreneurial activity that generates sustained long-
term economic growth.”); DAVID A. HARPER, FOUNDATIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (2003) (“Entrepreneurship is critical to enhancing the inno-
vativeness and responsiveness of businesses, to boosting productivity and to improving cost 
structures and trade performance. . . . Individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial teams 
bring to light the resources, technologies and trading opportunities that make economic 
development possible.”); J. Bradford DeLong et al., Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth 28-
29 (2002), http://scholar.harvard.edu/lkatz/files/sustaining_us_econ_growth.pdf. 
 13. See, e.g., JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO 
BOOST ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT 4-7, 10 (2009) (discussing ways by which the public sector can stimulate high potential 
new entities and criticizing the focus on size and existing institutions such as the Small 
Business Investment Company); Sean M. O’Connor, The Central Role of Law as a Meta 
Method in Creativity and Entrepreneurship, in CREATIVITY, LAW & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 87, 
88 (Shubha Ghosh & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2011) (“[A]n obsessive focus on ‘great 
works’—artifacts that stand the test of time—has obscured the proper role for innovation 
methods and meta methods. At the same time, some of the most contentious issues in IP 
today involve exclusive rights to lower levels of these methods such as business and tax 
method patents.”); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 14. The recent Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-
305, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) was the first real stab at attempting to do so but attracted 
much criticism for failing to accomplish its goal. See Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Presentation at the Kaufmann Foundation Conference on Fed-
eral Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship (Sept. 27, 2013) (examining federal policy options to 
increase innovation in the U.S.); see also Investing in Innovation for Education Act of 2015, 
H.R. 847, 114th Cong. (2015) (a bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 to invest in innovation for education); Technology-Enabled Education Innova-
tion Partnership Act, H.R. 566, 114th Cong. (2015) (a bill to award grants to improve 
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have outlined changes in the laws governing immigration, taxation 
and financial institutions, as well as contracts, torts, patents, educa-
tion, land use, and other concerns.15 They have focused on improving 
the range of property rights and the rule of law.16 Yet, the question 
remains: To what degree are they successful in capturing the  
phenomenon?   
 All of these reform discussions lack something fundamental: they 
fail to recognize the contradicting nature of their topics. Legal rules 
impose duties and establish rights.17 The practice of law seeks order 
and authority and the continuity of tradition.18 Through causal rea-
soning, it advances an aim and pursues the means to achieve that 
aim.19 Using logical deductions lawyers create legal models and doc-
trinal rules to apply to complex circumstances.20 Law denotes the ex-
                                                                                                                  
equality of access to technology-enabled education innovations); Accelerating Biomedical 
Research Act, S. 318, 114th Cong. (2015) (a bill to prioritize funding for the National Insti-
tutes of Health to discover treatments and cures, to maintain global leadership in medical 
innovation, and to restore the purchasing power the NIH had after the historic doubling 
campaign that ended in fiscal year 2003); Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015) (a bill 
to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes). 
 15. See generally RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH 
THROUGH LEGAL REFORM, supra note 4 (a book devoted to legal reform proposal to stimu-
late growth through innovation); Zoltan J. Acs & Laszlo Szerb, Entrepreneurship, Economic 
Growth and Public Policy, 28 SMALL BUS. ECON. 109, 113-16 (2007) (making policy recom-
mendations including trade policy, immigration policy, access to foreign technology, educa-
tion, science and technology policy, and, finally, litigation and regulation).  
 16. Sean M. O’Connor, Controlling the Means of Innovation: The Centrality of Private 
Ordering Arrangements for Innovators and Entrepreneurs, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, 
INNOVATION AND GROWTH 274 (Robert Litan ed., 2011) (maintaining that the confidential 
treatment of many private ordering arrangements limits access to crucial source material 
needed for research); James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Do Patents Perform Like Prop-
erty? ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 22 (2008); Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 1537-38; see also 
Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne, Entrepreneurship and Development: Cause or 
Consequence?, 6 AUSTRIAN ECON. & ENTREP. STUD. 67, 77 (2003) (“The two most important 
‘core’ institutions for encouraging entrepreneurship are well-defined property rights and 
the rule of law.”). 
 17. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Lon-
don, John Murray 1832) (identifying the essence of law with command: laws are orders 
backed by threats).  
 18. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 
YALE L.J. 1, 84-85 (1989) (arguing that legal theory, which seeks truth through truly open 
discourse, and constitutional practice, which seeks order and authority and the continuity 
of tradition, will increasingly part ways).  
 19. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 11 (2001) (arguing a social practice takes a caus-
al-functional explanation and a Dworkinian interpretation); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed 
Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 636 (1984) (arguing that some legal doctrines, such as 
felony murder, the Pinkerton doctrine, the natural and probable consequence rule, and 
vicarious liability, have been strongly criticized for imposition liability where the causal 
connection is weak). 
 20. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Why the Law of Entrepreneurship Barely Matters, 31 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 701, 705 (2009).  
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istence of norms that deliver sanctions and remedies when certain 
conditions hold.21 It enforces rules and creates classifications that 
aim to direct behavior in a uniform manner.22  
 Entrepreneurship thrives on freedom and creativity.23 Its essence 
is making judgments about the unknown.24 Entrepreneurs make 
their decisions in a state of uncertainty, without being able to calcu-
late the likelihood or probabilities of an imminent sequence of 
events.25 Therefore, entrepreneurship involves the creative reading of 
                                                                                                                  
 21. See, e.g., David Morris Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 
228, 265 (1982) (“Once relative culpability is established, greater causal responsibility fol-
lows as a matter of law.”); Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 2054, 2061-72 (1995) (providing a thorough history of basic tenets of legal positivism). 
 22. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 881, 953 (1986) (“A dominant consideration is whether there is a need for a uniform 
national rule.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (arguing that the basic law of the corporate form aims to 
achieve a high degree of uniformity); Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory 
Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2004) (advocating for incorpora-
tion of the “Restatement of Statutory Interpretation” as advancing clarity, uniformity, and 
conservation of judicial resources). But see Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The 
Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1405 (1987) (“Were the Supreme 
Court’s primary task to correct errors of lower federal courts and state supreme courts and 
to achieve absolute uniformity in the national law, the Court would be doomed to failure.”).  
 23. Schumpeter famously was the first to refer to innovation as “creative destruction.” 
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 81-87 (5th ed. 1976); see 
also Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Manage-
ment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1018 (2005) (“[T]he social benefits of Internet-based innova-
tion, creativity, cultural production, education, political discourse and so on are not con-
fined to those who use the Internet; the social benefits spill over.”); R. Keith Sawyer, The 
Western Cultural Model of Creativity: Its Influence on Intellectual Property Law, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2027, 2052 (2011) (arguing that the Western cultural model conflicts with a 
scientific explanation of creativity and innovation); Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritu-
al: Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and Intellectual Property in Preliterate Societies, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1293 (1989) (“[S]uch magic-using collectivities restrict creative activ-
ity to a relatively small and socially isolated subgroup, buffering the society’s core technol-
ogy from unproven techniques.”); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectu-
al Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2003) (noting 
that creativity and invention is a profoundly dynamic process).  
 24. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-
Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1683 (2009) (noting that “[m]ost jurisdictions 
strictly require that an idea be absolutely and objectively novel—meaning unknown in the 
field in general—in order to receive protection.”); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fell-
meth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the 
Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 451 (2002) (stating that innovation involves 
unexpected results and previously unknown circumstances); Richard T. Rapp, The Misap-
plication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 46 
(1995) (“the optimal amount of R&D is unknown”). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (alluding 
that market actors seek to protect themselves against innovation because it is an  
unknown). 
 25. Frank Knight distinguished between risk—events with likelihood that can be 
estimated probabilistically—and uncertainty—events with unknown likelihood. See FRANK 
H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1971); see also Ronald J. Gilson et al., 
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the present and the imaginative prediction of the future.26 It prospers 
on deviations as opposed to traditional causation, and it involves 
adapting to disarray.27 In a state of disequilibrium, the entrepre-
neur’s alertness discovers profitable opportunities to match unmet 
demand with untapped supply.28 Therefore, entrepreneurs prefer le-
gal structures that provide them with greater autonomy.29  
 This Article argues that these differences matter. The nature of a 
legal solution is essentially cognitive and causal; it does not address 
the effectual aspects of entrepreneurship. The friction between law 
and entrepreneurship creates significant distortionary effects.30 
Through theoretical discourse, this Article maintains that a new ap-
                                                                                                                  
Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 433 n.2 (2009). 
 26. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 133 (2006) (“The emergence of the networked infor-
mation economy has the potential to increase individual autonomy. First, it increases the 
range and diversity of things that individuals can do for and by themselves.”); Jack M. 
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 45-48 (2004).  
 27. Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 819 (2007) (“[B]eyond seeking material success the crucial 
element in the entrepreneurial spirit is openness to change—an interest in the different 
and in new experiences while deemphasizing the safe and the proven.”); Lipshaw, supra 
note 20, at 706 (“I suggest that entrepreneurs are far more at home with inconsistency and 
indeterminacy.”); KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 269 (claiming that entrepreneurs differ in 
their intellectual capacity to decide what should be done, in their degree of confidence in 
their judgment, in their confidence and in how “venturesome [they are] to ‘assume the risk’ 
or ‘insure’ the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in return 
for an assignment of the actual results”).  
 28. See Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Pro-
cess: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 60, 62 (1997) (“These positive elements focus 
on the role of knowledge and discovery in the process of market equilibration. In particular 
this approach (a) sees equilibration as a systematic process in which market participants 
acquire more and more accurate and complete mutual knowledge of potential demand and 
supply attitudes, and (b) sees the driving force behind this systematic process in what will 
be described below as entrepreneurial discovery.”).  
 29. Matthias Benz, Entrepreneurship as a Non-Profit-Seeking Activity 1 (Inst. for Em-
pirical Res. in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 243, 2006), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=733283 (“Being an entrepreneur seems to be rather rewarding because it entails 
substantial non-monetary benefits, like greater autonomy, broader skill utilization, and the 
possibility to pursue one’s own ideas.”); see also Marco van Gelderen et al., The Multiple 
Sources of Autonomy as a Startup Motive (SCALES, Working Paper No. 200315, 2003), 
http://www.ondernemerschap.nl/pdf-ez/N200315.pdf (studying a sample of 167 nascent 
entrepreneurs motivated by autonomy and finding that beneath the surface of autonomy, 
entrepreneurs differ in their relative emphasis on the underlying sources of the autonomy 
motive); cf. Marco van Gelderen et al., Explaining Entrepreneurial Intentions by Means of 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour, 13 CAREER DEV. INT’L 538, 529 (2008) (examining empir-
ically the entrepreneurial intentions of business students and concluding their main mo-
tives are entrepreneurial alertness and the importance attached to financial security).  
 30. Cf. Phillips, supra note 21, at 276 (claiming that certain tort rules consider causes 
for purposes of the causal contribution defense, resulting in the law discouraging plainly 
desirable commercial activity for no good reason). 
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proach is necessary. It contends that a legal culture that wishes to 
entice greater innovation is one that requires its legal agents to think 
like entrepreneurs. While some scholars have developed frameworks 
for crafting laws that facilitate entrepreneurship, they have mostly 
focused on theories of risk.31 However, there is more to entrepreneur-
ship than taking risks.  
 Legislators advocating for reform have been unable to make much 
collective headway in fully capturing the essence of entrepreneur-
ship.32 A fundamentally different type of outlook is needed. This Arti-
cle takes an original approach to conceptualizing entrepreneurship 
by rethinking the process and visualizing it from the eyes of the en-
trepreneur. It offers a bridge between law and entrepreneurship by 
considering the four main elements that transmit entrepreneurship 
and that are inherent to the entrepreneur’s agenda: knowledge in-
tensity, transiency, uncertainty, and exit motive. It provides policy-
makers with more comprehensive tools to recognize the distinctive 
modus operandi of entrepreneurship while proposing to reform the 
law. 
 Part II of this Article defines entrepreneurship as it is used in this 
paper and explains why entrepreneurs are worthy of receiving spe-
cial attention in the law. Part III frames the entrepreneurship pro-
cess and the various elements of entrepreneurial actions. Part IV  
isolates the distinct characteristics of the entrepreneurship process 
while Part V points to the dissonance between the nature of the law 
and entrepreneurship using as case studies organizational and bank-
ruptcy classifications. More specifically, it illustrates the ways in 
which the legal system can facilitate entrepreneurial success or fail-
ure by viewing it through the lens of innovation. Part VI concludes by 
discussing the ways that this Article can stimulate future scholarship 
and empirical studies on the role law plays in the entrepreneurship 
process. 
                                                                                                                  
 31. See, e.g., infra note 39.  
 32. See, e.g., Edward C. Prescott & Lee E. Ohanian, Behind the Productivity Plunge: 
Fewer Startups, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 25, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-
the-productivity-plunge-fewer-startups-1403737197 (suggesting various reform proposals 
while criticizing the lack of success noting that “[i]n the absence of these reforms, there is 
little reason to believe that the depressed rate of new business creation will reverse itself”); 
Sudeep Reddy, U.S. News: Jobs Panel Pushes Help for Start-Ups, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 
2011, at A4 (“We are sympathetic to the political sensitivities around the topic of immigra-
tion reform,” the members said in the report. “But when it comes to driving job creation 
and increasing American competitiveness, separating the highly-skilled worker component 
is critical. We therefore call upon Congress to pass reforms aimed directly at allowing the 
most promising foreign-born entrepreneurs to remain in or relocate to the United States.”). 
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II.   WHAT IS ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?  
A.   Defining Entrepreneurship  
 The concepts of entrepreneurship and innovation play central 
roles in this Article. It will be helpful, therefore, to clarify the mean-
ing of these terms at the outset. Entrepreneurship has many poten-
tial connotations; the implications of the term are widely varied. The 
concept of “entrepreneur” was first mentioned in the seventeenth 
century by scholars such as Irish-French economist Richard Cantil-
lon and French economist Jean-Baptiste Say.33 Cantillon defined the 
entrepreneur as “the agent who buys means of production at certain 
prices . . . that are uncertain at the moment.”34 Say portrayed the en-
trepreneur as the agent “who unites all these means of production, 
and who finds . . . the value of the products.”35 Following Cantillon 
and Say, other theorists began to distinguish between ordinary busi-
nessmen and entrepreneurs.36 The work of Mises stressed the dynam-
ic and competitive entrepreneurial process, while Hayek stressed the 
informational processing capability of the market economy.37  
 Today, however, anyone can be considered an entrepreneur. En-
trepreneurship may refer to individuals, groups, or firms, whether 
small or large, private or public, domestic or international. It can  
involve moral or social, political or educational, individual, or collec-
tive characteristics.38 It may have distinct characteristics such as 
                                                                                                                  
 33. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial History (1949), 
reprinted in ESSAYS ON ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM 260 (Richard V. Clemence ed., 1989) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, 
Economic Theory]. Schumpeter also criticized Say’s contribution to the theory of entrepre-
neurship describing it as “the pithy statement that the entrepreneur’s function is to com-
bine the factors of production into a producing organism. Such a statement may indeed 
mean much or little. He certainly failed to make full use of it and presumably did not see 
all its analytic possibilities.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 555 
(1954) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, HISTORY] (footnote omitted).  
 34. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 254; see also SCHUMPETER, 
HISTORY, supra note 33, at 555. 
 35. JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, CATECHISM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 28 (John Richter trans., 
London, Sherwood, Neely, & Jones 1816).  
 36. For a survey of the history of the definition, see Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theo-
ry of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 242 (1997). For a historical over-
view of Austrian School of Economics on the topic of entrepreneurship and innovation, see 
Peter J. Boettke, Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of its Unique-
ness, 15 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 263, 263-74 (2002).   
 37. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 253 (3d ed. 1966) 
(arguing that the functions of the entrepreneur, the landowner, the capitalist, and the 
worker are very often combined by the same person); F. A. von Hayek, Economics and 
Knowledge, 4 ECONOMICA 33, 34 (1937).  
 38. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
283, 283 (2008) (“Nowadays, ‘social entrepreneurs’ tackle civic problems through innova-
tive methods, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ promote new forms of government action, ‘norm entre-
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creativity and risk-taking.39 Many factors, including independence, 
confidence, and resilience, have been found to affect entrepreneurial 
decisions to take risks and be innovative.40 Yet no agreement exists 
today on the qualities that are inherent to the entrepreneurial  
persona.41  
 Notwithstanding the proliferation of the term, this Article will  
focus on theorizing the economic entrepreneurial phenomenon as a 
process and isolating its distinct traits. In this Article, “innovation” 
denotes a process through which economic leaders (referred to as “en-
trepreneurs”) act “entrepreneurially” by way of discovering and im-
                                                                                                                  
preneurs’ seek to change the way society thinks or behaves, and ‘moral entrepreneurs’ try 
to alter the boundaries of duty or compassion. ‘Ethnification entrepreneurs,’ ‘polarization 
entrepreneurs,’ and other newfangled spinoffs pursue more discrete objectives. Entrepre-
neurial rhetoric has never been so trendy or so plastic.”); Pramodita Sharma & James J. 
Chrisman, Toward a Reconciliation of the Definitional Issues in the Field of Corporate En-
trepreneurship, 23 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC. 11, 12 (1999) (“Entrepreneurship 
has meant different things to different people.”). 
 39. On the entrepreneurial spirit and an overview of the psychological theories of 
entrepreneurial attributes, see Licht, supra note 27, at 832 (“Entrepreneurs are indeed 
special individuals in that they tend to exhibit a particular combination of psychological 
attributes compatible with their role in the economy as new venture creators. Needless to 
say, this does not mean that all entrepreneurs exhibit these attributes equally strongly 
during their entire career.”); see also Edward P. Lazear, Balanced Skills and Entrepreneur-
ship, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 208 (2004); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law As Stimulus: The 
Role of Law in Fostering Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 INFO. SOC’Y J.L. & POL’Y 153, 170 
(2010) (“[Entrepreneurs] are somehow better than the average human . . . they are better 
able to evaluate risks and rewards.”); Manju Puri & David T. Robinson, Who Are Entre-
preneurs and Why Do They Behave That Way (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/events/conferences/2006/comparativeAdvantage/751_P
uri_Manju.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). In the beginning of his writing, Schumpeter 
emphasized individual-level psychological factors to explain the behavior of the entrepre-
neur but later moved to a social level explanation underlying collective level. Introduction 
to THE ENTREPRENEUR: CLASSIC TEXTS BY JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER 1, 16 (Markus C. Becker 
et al. eds., 2011).  
 40. See, e.g., Licht, supra note 27, at 823 (“[P]eople differ in the qualities necessary to 
engage in entrepreneurship. Relative to the average person, the entrepreneur is therefore 
particularly ‘venturesome’ . . . .”) (footnote omitted); see also Robert H. Brockhaus, Sr., Risk 
Taking Propensity of Entrepreneurs, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 509 (1980). 
 41. See Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 337 (2005) (describing studies using the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator to categorize entrepreneurial personality types); Pozen, supra note 38, at 293 
(“Many have linked entrepreneurship to economic growth and to a characteristic menu of 
personality traits.”); Hao Zhao et al., The Relationship of Personality to Entrepreneurial 
Intentions and Performance: A Meta-Analytic Review, 36 J. MGMT. 381, 392-94 (2010); see 
also Carl P. Kaiser, Entrepreneurship and Resource Allocation, 16 E. ECON. J. 9, 10 (1990) 
(“[P]rospective entrepreneurs will differ with respect to how much risk they are willing to 
bear, and with respect to how much utility they receive from undertaking ‘their own’ pro-
jects. Accordingly, the rate of return required by an individual to undertake a given ven-
ture is determined by the individual's opportunity rate of return, the degree to which the 
individual prefers risk, and the degree to which the individual receives utility from the act 
of creating a new enterprise and exercising complete and absolute control over the  
venture.”).  
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plementing knowledge of value.42 The type of entrepreneurship that 
is relevant for this purpose is that which contributes to economic de-
velopment.43 Economists called for a distinction between different 
types of businesses.44 They differentiated between necessity entre-
preneurship, which is created because of a lack of other employment 
options, and opportunity entrepreneurship, which is an active choice 
to pursue an unexploited or underexploited business opportunity. 
Others found that necessity entrepreneurship causes negative GDP 
growth, while opportunity entrepreneurship has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on economic development.45 A nation’s economic devel-
opment, they concluded, depends on successful opportunity entrepre-
neurship combined with the force of established corporations.46 
 Accordingly, entrepreneurship in this Article refers to the actions 
of for-profit firms or sole proprietors that are innovative, rather than 
imitative, and more likely to contribute to economic growth.47 Un-
doubtedly, the actions of social entrepreneurs and non-for-profit or-
ganizations are extremely valuable in society.48 Yet these types of ac-
                                                                                                                  
 42. For similar delineations, see THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 67.  
 43. See D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Law & Entrepreneurship: Do Courts Mat-
ter?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 353, 357 (2007) (“While various disciplines study issues 
relating to entrepreneurship, such as the characteristics of entrepreneurs or the perfor-
mance of entrepreneurial firms, law and entrepreneurship studies should focus on the 
study of the optimal legal structures that facilitate the commercialization of entrepreneur-
ial opportunities, as well as the regulation of entrepreneurial firms.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 44. KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 293 (Samuel  
Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Frederick Engels ed., Charles Kerr & Co. 1994) (1867) 
(comparing entrepreneurs to capitalists); see also Zoltan Acs, How Is Entrepreneurship 
Good for Economic Growth?, 1 INNOVATIONS 97, 98 (2006); John L. Orcutt, Improving the 
Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of 
Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 863 (2005) (differenti-
ating between entrepreneurial entities and livelihood businesses, describing the latter as 
“job churners”); Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance in a Networked Age, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 711, 729 (2015) (noting that there is a distinction between entrepreneur 
and investor, “opportunity-driven” and “operationally driven” leaders). 
 45. Acs, supra note 44, at 99. 
 46. Id. at 97, 104; see also Zoltan J. Acs, “Entrepreneurial Capitalism” in Capitalist 
Development: Toward a Synthesis of Capitalist Development and the “Economy as a Whole,” 
in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 319, 319 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 
2009). 
 47. See William J. Baumol, Return of the Invisible Men: The Microeconomic Value 
Theory of Inventors and Entrepreneurs 2-3, Paper Presented at the American Economic 
Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2006). Schumpeter clarified that the deployment of 
existing resources in an ordinary manner is not a new combination. JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, The Theory of Economic Development (1934), reprinted in THE 
ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 50 [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, The Theory]; JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, Entrepreneur (1928), reprinted in THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 245 
[hereinafter SCHUMPETER, Entrepreneur]. 
 48. See Pozen, supra note 38, at 283 (“People who tackle civic problems through inno-
vative methods are ‘social entrepreneurs.’ ”); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 
EMORY L.J. 1257, 1279 (2011) (arguing that the nonprofit form can create a special “warm-
 
2016]  THROUGH THE LENS OF INNOVATION 963 
 
tors require a different set of incentives and characteristics and are a 
topic for a separate paper. Instead, this Article relies on the Schum-
peterian definition of entrepreneurship as combining resources and 
creating new market demands that lead to large economic gains.49 It 
focuses on differentiating between ordinary businessmen and entre-
preneurs based on the extent and nature of their actions, their mo-
tives, and the conditions in which they act.50 While identifying entre-
preneurial firms from others is not an easy task, studies focused on 
the actions of firms that invest a high proportion of their income in 
knowledge procurement in hope of deriving profits and expanding 
their labor force.51 The next Section will further discuss these aspects 
after establishing the importance of entrepreneurship to the economy. 
B.   The Significance of Entrepreneurship to the Economy 
 Law is a key conduit for Congress to support entrepreneurship.52 
Every commercial process can enjoy a legal system that emphasizes 
balance, flexibility, and predictability. What is it about the entrepre-
neurship process that merits distinct consideration? The answer is 
simple: entrepreneurship is the driving force of economic develop-
ment.53 From 1980–2005, firms less than five years old accounted for 
nearly all net job growth in the country, and in 2007 alone, these 
                                                                                                                  
glow” identity that cannot be replicated by the for-profit form). The author later notes that 
some call a social entrepreneur anyone who starts a nonprofit organization. Id. at 294; see 
also Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tan-
gled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2463-64 (2005) (providing a taxonomy of 
social entrepreneurship, non-profits and “venture philanthropy”); Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 690 (2013) (describing the new 
forms of social enterprises such as the low-profit limited liability company (L3C), benefit 
corporation, and flexible purpose corporation (FPC) as a forum for social entrepreneurs to 
safely proclaim their blended missions proudly); Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, 
Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. 
L. REV. 1495, 1544 (2013) (describing the phenomenon of the social enterprise).  
 49. SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47. 
 50. See infra Part IV.  
 51. For an attempt of providing a model that identifies entrepreneurial firms, see 
Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Legal Mirrors of Entrepreneurship, 55 B.C. L. REV. 719, 740 (2014).  
 52. SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47, at 55.  
 53. See PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND 
PRINCIPLES 21-22 (1985); PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 10 
(2d ed. 2004) (examining empirically the various aspects of economic contribution of ven-
ture capital); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81 (1973) (argu-
ing that entrepreneurship is important primarily in enabling the market process to work 
itself out in all contexts); KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 41 (claiming that the entrepreneur 
plays a unique importance in a productive economy); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND 
THE BUSINESS CYCLE 74 (1955) (referring to entrepreneurship as the “fundamental phe-
nomenon of economic development”).  
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same young firms accounted for nearly two-thirds of job creation.54 
Accordingly, a government that emphasizes the promotion of (or the 
removal of restrictions to) economic growth should focus on the ele-
ments that yield such an outcome.  
 F. A. Von Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises, the founders of the Aus-
trian School of economics, portrayed entrepreneurs as responsible for 
creating economic cycles. Hayek perceived entrepreneurs as forward-
looking and responsible for market innovation.55 Mises portrayed the 
entrepreneur as the “acting man” who is “exclusively seen from the 
aspect of the uncertainty inherent in every action,” that, when cor-
rect, leads to growth and prosperity.56 They both held that upward 
economic movements are the result of means of production and labor 
devoted to new enterprises.57  
 Joseph Schumpeter is considered the leading economist of the 
Austrian School of Economics and the sire of entrepreneurship theo-
ry.58 In his essay, The Analysis of Economic Change,59 he presented 
his view of the economic process.60 He portrayed economic develop-
ment as a dynamic process of change through “Creative Destruc-
tion.”61 The circular flow of economic life, he claimed, evolves through 
a process of cycles of punctuated equilibria disrupted by sudden leaps 
of endogenous innovations.62 According to Schumpeter, entrepreneur-
ship is the destabilizing force and principle agent of change in econ-
omy.63 Entrepreneurs are special because they create “new combina-
tions,” namely by introducing new products, developing new methods 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See John Haltiwanger et al., Who Creates Jobs? Small Versus Large Versus Young, 
95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 347, 360 (2013); Global Entrepreneurship Week, FED. NEWS FEED 
(Dec. 15, 2015, 4:51 PM). 
 55. Hayek, supra note 37, at 33.  
 56. VON MISES, supra note 37, at 253 (stating that “the term entrepreneur as used by 
catallactic theory means: acting man exclusively seen from the aspect of the uncertainty 
inherent in every action”). 
 57. Ludwig Von Mises, The “Austrian” Theory of the Trade Cycle (1936), reprinted in 
THE AUSTRIAN THEORY OF THE TRADE CYCLE AND OTHER ESSAYS 25, 29 (1996).  
 58. See THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that Schumpeter’s most fa-
mous work is on the theory of entrepreneurship). 
 59. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Analysis of Economic Change, 17 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
2 (1935).  
 60. Id.; see also SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47 (“Development in our sense 
is then defined by the carrying out of new combinations.”).  
 61. SCHUMPETER, supra note 23.  
 62. Pozen, supra note 38, at 290-91; see also THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 18 
(stating that in the book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter describes the 
economic process as a long period of stability interrupted by shocks that are followed by a 
period of static economy). 
 63. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 262-63 (“What we observe  
is . . . the effects of entrepreneurial activity upon the industrial structure that exits at any 
moment . . . .”).  
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of production, devising new business models, and creating new mar-
kets—creations that confront and eventually defeat previously exist-
ing economic orders.64 By implementing innovations, entrepreneurs 
destroy the basis for the old economy while paving the way to a new 
economic order of prosperity and welfare.65  
 Contemporary economic theorist William Baumol emphasized the 
importance of entrepreneurship in stimulating growth.66 Baumol ar-
gued that economic evolution is dependent on two determinants: in-
novations and entrepreneurs.67 He argued that entrepreneurs are 
responsible for revolutionary breakthroughs.68 He attributed the suc-
cess of the capitalist economy primarily to competitive pressures by 
these players, with innovation as their prime weapon.69 Cutting-edge 
innovation, rather than pricing and economies of scale, is the key to 
economic success.70 Rapid diffusion of innovation throughout the 
economy, he argued, ultimately results in economic growth.71  
 Economist Israel Kirzner also portrayed entrepreneurship as a 
function of innovation and economic evolution.72 He observed econom-
ic growth as originating from entrepreneurial activity.73 He argued 
that the market state of disequilibrium creates opportunities for en-
trepreneurs.74 In his view, economic development is driven by entre-
                                                                                                                  
 64. SCHUMPETER, supra note 53.  
 65. See id. at 74-75. 
 66. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING 
THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 2 (2002) (“[O]nce capitalism was in place and fully 
operational, a flow of innovation and the consequent rise in productivity and per capita 
gross domestic product were to be expected. Whatever the deficiencies of the free market, it 
is certainly very good at one thing: the manufacture of economic growth.”); William J. 
Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, 11 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 3, 4 (1996); William J. Baumol, Formal Entrepreneurship Theory in Economics: 
Existence and Bounds, 8 J. BUS. VENTURING 197, 198 (1993).   
 67. See William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 
64-66 (1968).  
 68. See BAUMOL, supra note 66, at 30-31. 
 69. Id. at 12-15.  
 70. Id. at 3-4 (“It is clear that innovation plays a far larger role in the activities of 
many key firms and industries than the current theoretical literature takes into account.”). 
 71. Baumol points to the computer industry for example, “whose new and improved 
models appear constantly, each manufacturer battling to stay ahead of its rivals.” Id. at 4. 
 72. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 81; see also Kirzner, supra note 28, at 67.  
 73. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 5 (1992). Kirzner was a student of Lud-
wig von Mises, another one of the key contributors to the Austrian economic school of 
thought. For a review of Austrian school of economics literature, see Boettke, supra note 36 
at 263-74.  
 74. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 81. See generally ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY 
AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985) [hereinafter KIRZNER, DISCOVERY] (expanding the 
work of Mises and Hayek, Kirzner establishes the importance of entrepreneurial alertness 
to profit opportunities); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE MARKET: ESSAYS 
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preneurs who act as agents responsible for equilibrating the mar-
ket.75 Entrepreneurs are unique in that they can identify and grasp 
opportunities ignored by others.76  
 Scholars today continue the Austrian School’s central view of en-
trepreneurship as a central determinant to stimulate an economy.77 
They have illustrated that young, entrepreneurial firms are the en-
gine of employment growth in the United States.78 On the other 
hand, studies have indicated that intrapreneurship (entrepreneurial 
divisions or employees within large or established firms) is also re-
sponsible for developing vigorous internal entrepreneurship.79 Thus, 
it is the entrepreneurial character of the firm that matters, not its 
size.80 American economist and Nobel laureate Robert Solow 
acknowledged that long-term economic growth has moved to the top 
of the political and intellectual agenda.81 His work continued to es-
tablish the primacy of innovations as responsible for economic growth 
through increases in output per worker.82 Scholars from the New 
Keynesian School of Economics, such as Carl Shapiro, Joseph 
Stiglitz, and Paul Romer also emphasized the central role of techno-
logical progress in economic development.83 Throughout history many 
                                                                                                                  
IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2002) (continuing the Mises-Hayek legacy and examining 
the market economy and theories of Competition and Entrepreneurship).  
 75. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE 
THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 110-11 (1979). 
 76. Id. at 109 (“[T]he essence of the entrepreneurial decision consists in grasping the 
knowledge that might otherwise remain unexploited.”). 
 77. Licht, supra note 27, at 821 & n.9 (surveying the modern literature holding inno-
vation key to economic development). 
 78. See John Haltiwanger, Entrepreneurship and Job Growth, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 46, at 119, 119. 
 79. See generally Karina Skovvang Christensen, Enabling Intrapreneurship: The Case 
of a Knowledge-Intensive Industrial Company, 8 EUR. J. INNOVATION MGMT. 305 (2005) 
(describing the phenomenon of intrapreneurship in a large knowledge-intensive industrial 
firm); see also Arshad M. Khan & V. Manopichetwattana, Innovative and Noninnovative 
Small Firms: Types and Characteristics, 35 MGMT. SCI. 597, 598 (1989); Smith & Ueda, 
supra note 43, at 356.  
 80. See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Defi-
nitions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1045-46 (2013) (arguing that current legal demarcations 
concentrated on “smallness” generate undesirable distributional effects, produce inefficient 
allocation of government resources, and defeat policy considerations of promoting entre-
preneurship and economic growth).  
 81. Robert Solow, Robert Solow on Joseph Schumpeter, ECONOMIST’S VIEW (May 17, 
2007), http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/05/robert_solow_on.html 
(reviewing Thomas K. McCraw, Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative 
Destruction).  
 82. See id.  
 83. See generally NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (Jo-
seph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986) (containing sixteen essays that test 
economic development hypotheses); Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 
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economists from different schools of thought postulated that entre-
preneurial change is a core variable of economic growth driven by the 
introduction of innovation by entrepreneurs.84 Entrepreneurship, 
they contended, contributes to growth by creating new businesses 
and jobs, intensifying competition, and increasing productivity.85 
 A vast amount of empirical research has established that entre-
preneurship can facilitate growth through dissipation of knowledge.86 
Steven Klepper recently reiterated these ideas in a study on 
knowledge spillover in Silicon Valley.87 He showed that in open mar-
kets with free market-entry entrepreneurs function as a conduit for 
facilitating the spillover of knowledge. They take knowledge that 
might otherwise have remained uncommercialized and use it to 
launch new products.88 Other scholars, such as Lemley, Jaffe,
                                                                                                                  
J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1994) (offering an assessment of scale-variant Schumpeterian growth 
model).  
 84. See Horst Hanusch & Andreas Pyka, Principles of Neo-Schumpeterian Economics, 
31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 275, 275 (2007). See generally Horst Hanusch et al., A Neo-
Schumpeterian Approach Towards Public Sector Economics (Universität Augsburg, Insti-
tute for Economics, Discussion Paper Series No. 306, 2009), http://ideas.repec.org/ 
s/aug/augsbe.html.  
 85. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 86 (1997) (contending that established firms 
are captive to the financial structure and organizational culture inherent in the value net-
work in which they compete—a capacity that can block any rationale for timely investment 
in the next wave of destructive technology). 
 86. See, e.g., DAVID B. AUDRETSCH ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 5 (2006); ANDRÉ VAN STEL, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2006) (“The importance of entrepreneurship for achieving economic 
growth in contemporary economies is widely recognized, both by policy makers and econo-
mists.”); Zoltan J. Acs et al., The Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, 32 
SMALL BUS. ECON. 15 (2009); Ricardo J. Caballero & Adam B. Jaffe, How High Are the 
Giants’ Shoulders: An Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruc-
tion in a Model of Economic Growth, 8 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 15 (1993); see 
also David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography 
of Innovation, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2713, 2714 (2004); 
Brett Anitra Gilbert et al., Clusters, Knowledge Spillovers and New Venture Performance: 
An Empirical Examination, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 405, 406 (2008); Zvi Griliches, The 
Search for R&D Spillovers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3768, 
1991), http://www.nber.org/papers/w3768. See generally ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, 
AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES (Eytan Sheshinski et 
al. eds., 2007). 
 87. Steven Klepper, Silicon Valley, A Chip off the Old Detroit Bloc, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 46, at 79, 79-81 (contending 
that entrepreneurs function as a conduit for facilitating spillover of knowledge, as they 
take knowledge that might otherwise have remained uncommercialized). 
 88. See id. at 80; see also Rajshree Agarwal et al., The Process of Creative Construc-
tion: Knowledge Spillovers, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth, 1 STRATEGIC 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 263, 263 (2007) (discussing how entrepreneurial ideas and  
opportunities are generated and how knowledge spillovers create a process of creative  
construction). 
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Thompson, and Shane, contended that entrepreneurship not only fa-
cilitates technological change but also generates opportunities for 
third-party firms, thereby driving regional development.89 
 Zoltan J. Acs and David B. Audretsch argued that innovation cap-
ital leads to a higher level of economic growth and is instrumental  
in providing a missing link in the development of the economy.90  
Entrepreneurship is important in commercializing investments  
in knowledge and ideas that might otherwise have remained un-
tapped.91 It contributes to economic growth by creating new jobs, in-
tensifying competition, and increasing productivity.92 As knowledge 
context increases, spillover effects stimulate more entrepreneurship.93  
 Indeed, from 1948–2012, “over half of the total increase in U.S. 
productivity growth, a key driver of economic growth, came from in-
novation and technological change.”94 Economic recovery has acceler-
ated in recent years, growing from “2.8 percent over the past two 
years, compared with 2.1 percent over the first three-and-a-half years 
of the recovery.”95 The U.S. “labor market is in the midst of the long-
est stretch of monthly job growth on record.”96 Realizing the signifi-
cance of entrepreneurship to the economy, the next Part models its 
progression. 
                                                                                                                  
 89. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 
(2006); Adam B. Jaffe et al., Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced 
by Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577, 577-98 (1993); Scott Shane, Technological  
Opportunities and New Firm Creation, 47 MGMT. SCI. 205, 205-20 (2001); Peter  
Thompson & Melanie Fox-Kean, Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge Spillo-
vers: A Reassessment, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 450, 450-60 (2005). 
 90. See generally, e.g., AUDRETSCH ET AL., supra note 86; Zoltan J. Acs et al., Why En-
trepreneurship Matters, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 
46, at 1.  
 91. Acs et al., supra note 90, at 8; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 85, at 86 (con-
tending that established firms are captive to the financial structure and organizational 
culture inherent in the value network in which they compete—a capacity that can block 
any rationale for timely investment in the next wave of destructive technology). 
 92. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 85, at 86 (arguing that established firms are captive 
to the financial structure and organizational culture inherent in the value network in 
which they compete—a capacity that can block any rationale for timely investment in the 
next wave of destructive technology). 
 93. See generally AUDRETSCH ET AL., supra note 86; Acs et al., supra note 90.  
 94. White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The White House Releases New 
Strategy for American Innovation, Announces Areas of Opportunity from Self-Driving Cars 
to Smart Cities (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/21/ 
fact-sheet-white-house-releases-new-strategy-american-innovation.  
 95. Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Remarks at The Brookings 
Institution: Trade, Innovation, and Economic Growth 1 (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150408_trade_innovation_growth_br
ookings.pdf. 
 96. Id.  
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III.   THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP PROCESS  
 Innovation is a function of economic evolution.97 Over the last few 
decades, a vast amount of literature has been developed that estab-
lishes the characteristics of individual entrepreneurs, especially from 
a psychological perspective.98 This type of scholarship portrays entre-
preneurs as special individuals who tend to exhibit a particular com-
bination of traits that enable them to assume the role of innovators.99  
Such literature has emphasized that entrepreneurs are better able to 
understand and evaluate certain risks and their returns.100 Factors 
such as independence, creativity, confidence, and resilience were 
found to affect an entrepreneur’s decision to take risks and be inno-
vative.101 Yet to date, there is no agreement on the qualities that are 
necessary for entrepreneurs to be successful.102  
 It is difficult to isolate human actions that fully capture entrepre-
neurial elements. Behind every entrepreneurial firm are individuals 
                                                                                                                  
 97. Cf. Kirzner, supra note 28, at 67 (discussing how the modern Austrian economists 
learned to “see the market as an entrepreneurially driven process” and to “appreciate the 
role of knowledge and its enhancement through market interaction”). 
 98. See, e.g., Licht, supra note 27, at 832 (“Entrepreneurs are indeed special individu-
als in that they tend to exhibit a particular combination of psychological attributes compat-
ible with their role in the economy as new venture creators. Needless to say, this does not 
mean that all entrepreneurs exhibit these attributes equally strongly during their entire 
career.”). In the beginning of his writing, Schumpeter emphasized individual-level psycho-
logical factors to explain the behavior of the entrepreneur but later moved to a social level 
explanation underlying the collective level. THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 16. 
 99. See, e.g., G.T. Lumpkin & Gregory G. Dess, Clarifying the Entrepreneurial Orien-
tation Construct and Linking It to Performance, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 135 (1996) (propos-
ing contingency framework for investigating the relationship between entrepreneurial 
orientation and firm performance.).  
 100. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 39, at 170 (“[Entrepreneurs] are somehow better 
than the average human . . . . [T]hey are better able to evaluate risks and rewards.”). Other 
studies found that entrepreneurs are usually able to identify opportunities due to their 
knowledge in a particular sector or industry and therefore perceive lower risks than others 
do. See generally, e.g., Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. 
ECON. 643 (1961); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 101. See Licht, supra note 27, at 823 (“Like Schumpeter and previous writers, Knight 
too believed that people differ in the qualities necessary to engage in entrepreneurship. 
Relative to the average person, the entrepreneur is therefore particularly ‘venturesome,’ 
self-confident, and tends to act independently on her own opinion.”) (footnote omitted). Yet, 
economists, such as Brockhaus, that followed Schumpeter’s theory argued that risk-taking 
behavior cannot be used as a distinguishing characteristic of entrepreneurship. Brockhaus, 
supra note 40, at 509.  
 102. See Kaiser, supra note 41, at 10 (“[P]rospective entrepreneurs will differ with re-
spect to how much risk they are willing to bear, and with respect to how much utility they 
receive from undertaking ‘their own’ projects. Accordingly, the rate of return required by 
an individual to undertake a given venture is determined by the individual’s opportunity 
rate of return, the degree to which the individual prefers risk, and the degree to which the 
individual receives utility from the act of creating a new enterprise and exercising complete 
and absolute control over the venture.”). 
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or groups of people with unique characteristics and entrepreneurial 
spirits. Regulating the commercialization of entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities is mostly administrable at the entity level.103 Actions, rather 
than psychological attributes, are what give meaning to the entre-
preneurship process.104 Accordingly, this Part will consider entrepre-
neurship from the womb to the tomb. It will unfold the entrepreneur-
ship process and frame it in four main stages: discovery, concept de-
velopment, implementation, and harvesting success or failure.  
A.   Discovery of Opportunities  
 The main element that distinguishes the entrepreneurship pro-
cess from other business undertakings is novelty.105 Decision-making 
in the business context involves entrepreneurial and non-
entrepreneurial actions. The latter usually entails the task of calcu-
lation,106 the deployment of production factors that happen to be un-
used, or the readjustment of production means.107 The entrepreneuri-
al aspect of decision-making is discovery.108 Innovative ideas chal-
lenge the current body of knowledge and eventually push society for-
ward by destroying old premises.109  Discovery is a self-determining 
decision to carry out “new combinations” by introducing new prod-
ucts, new markets, or deploying existing means of production in a 
unique way.110  
                                                                                                                  
 103. Smith & Ueda, supra note 43, at 356-57 (“While various disciplines study issues 
relating to entrepreneurship, such as the characteristics of entrepreneurs or the perfor-
mance of entrepreneurial firms, law and entrepreneurship studies should focus on the 
study of the optimal legal structures that facilitate the commercialization of entrepreneur-
ial opportunities, as well as the regulation of entrepreneurial firms.”) (footnotes omitted). 
For a discussion on the entrepreneurial spirit and an overview of the psychological theories 
of entrepreneurial attributes, see generally Licht, supra note 27. 
 104. See Jeffrey G. Covin & Dennis P. Slevin, A Conceptual Model of Entrepreneurship 
as Firm Behavior, 16 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 7, 8 (1991). 
 105. Smith & Ueda, supra note 43, at 354-56 (“In Schumpeter’s view, the entrepreneur 
is the agent of creative destruction, and the distinguishing attribute of entrepreneurial 
activity is novelty.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 106. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 40, 46; KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 16-17. 
 107. SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47, at 51 (“There are always unemployed 
workmen, unsold raw materials, unused productive capacity, and so forth. This certainly is 
a contributory circumstance, a favorable condition and even an incentive to the emergence 
of new combinations; but great unemployment is only the consequence of noneconomic 
events—as for example the World War—or precisely of the development which we are  
investigating.”). 
 108. See Tom Bottomore, Introduction to JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY ix (Harper & Row 1976) (1942) (noting that Schumpeter re-
garded innovation as the essential feature of capitalism); KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 16. 
 109. See SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47, at 50. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 64; see also SCHUMPETER, supra note 53, at 68 
(“The carrying out of new combinations means, therefore, simply the different employment 
of the economic system’s existing supplies of productive means—which might provide a 
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 Kirzner developed the notion of entrepreneurial “alertness” to de-
note the quest for innovative knowledge.111 He argued that entrepre-
neurs are often dissatisfied with the current available knowledge. 
That dissatisfaction inspires them to be alert to changing conditions 
and overlooked possibilities.112 Entrepreneurial discovery ensues 
when entrepreneurs believe they have revealed possibilities for inno-
vation that actual or potential competitors had hitherto not seen. 113  
 Some entrepreneurial discoveries may also generate negative ex-
ternalities.114 Creativeness at its peak can also create societal harms 
or wasteful, inefficient, or destructive outcomes.115 Nevertheless, 
when used in a positive manner, entrepreneurship overall improves 
the efficiency of our lives.116 The first step in the entrepreneurship 
process, then, is the search for the discoveries or new combinations 
that will achieve a constructive effect.117 This entails observing cur-
                                                                                                                  
second definition of development in our sense. That rudiment of a pure economic theory of 
development . . . .”).  
 111. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY supra note 74, at 12.  
 112. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 38-39; see also VON MISES, supra note 37, at 112  
(“Understanding is always based on incomplete knowledge.”); Hayek, supra note 37, at 35.  
 113. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles (1939), reprinted in THE 
ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 292 [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles] (“Of 
course the reverse would not be true: not every new plant embodies an innovation; some 
are mere additions to the existing apparatus of an industry bearing either no relation to 
innovation or no other relation than is implied in their being built in response to an in-
crease in demand ultimately traceable to the effects of innovations that have occurred 
elsewhere.”) (footnote omitted); SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47. 
 114. Entrepreneurs can create harms such as terrorism, pollution, pornography, etc. 
See, e.g., FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF 
PORNOGRAPHY IN THE CYBER AGE xiv-xv (2000); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1646 (2011) (examining situations in which “pollution entrepreneurs” 
generate harm purposely, in order to extract payments in exchange for desisting); Gaia J. 
Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce Innovation to 
Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 163 (2012) (“These 
breaks encourage innovation to increase drilling, but not to reduce the resulting environ-
mental and social harms.”). 
 115. See Garry Wills, New Statesman, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/books/review/philip-bobbitts-garments-of-court-and-
palace.html (“Terrorists are ‘entrepreneurial,’ so our market state must be an entrepre-
neurial state.”); Jenna Wortham, Founder of a Provocative Web Site Forms a New Outlet, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/technology/internet/ 
14poole.html (“For most entrepreneurs, running a Web site that is rife with pornography 
and frequently criticized as a menace to society would not be considered a résumé booster. 
Many venture capitalists would head in the opposite direction. But Christopher Poole, the 
23-year-old founder of 4chan, one of the largest forums on the Internet and widely consid-
ered to be one of the darkest corners of the Web, has never shied away from his first  
creation.”). 
 116. Steven H. Hobbs, Entrepreneurship and Law: Accessing the Power of the Creative 
Impulse, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 (2009) (citing DONALD F. KURATKO & RICHARD M. 
HODGETTS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 121 (5th ed. 2001)).  
 117. SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47, at 48-50. 
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rent opportunities and studying inefficiencies, wasteful processes, or 
failed projects with the aim of improving them or creating new ones. 
It could yield either valuable or useless results that will lead to en-
trepreneurial success or failure.118  
 At this critical stage of discovery, entrepreneurs heavily invest in 
knowledge procurement, more so than others, in observing their envi-
ronment, collecting market research data, and determining current 
and future resources required to develop the opportunities.119 Next, 
entrepreneurs conceptualize the idea. This is far from being an easy 
task. Doubts and uncertainties are inevitable elements of this pro-
cess.120 Entrepreneurs need to overcome the uncertainty hurdle and 
proceed with developing what they perceive as the future.121  
B.   Resourcing and Concept Development 
 Following the discovery stage, the entrepreneurship process pro-
ceeds to conceptualizing and planning. This stage entails evaluating 
the discovery, looking at available resources, calculating the return 
on investment, the real and perceived value of the opportunity, and 
its risks and rewards.122 It includes establishing the goals of the pro-
ject and identifying its uniqueness and competitive advantage over 
existing rivals. Entrepreneurs do so in the shadow of uncertainty 
lacking future market information.123  
 The business model and strategy are essentially the entrepre-
neurs’ theory regarding how they will make money from their idea. It 
involves an assumption of a market need and a hypothesis about how 
much customers would be willing to pay for the product.124 Entrepre-
                                                                                                                  
 118. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 51.  
 119. See, e.g., Mark G. Brown & Raynold A. Svenson, Measuring R&D Productivity, 31 
RES. TECH. MGMT. 11, 11 (1988).  
 120. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 67.  
 121. See id. at 22-23.  
 122. See JAMES O. FIET, THE SYSTEMATIC SEARCH FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL DISCOVERIES 
128 (2002) (describing the search and evaluation process); Nicholas Dew et al., Affordable 
Loss: Behavioral Economic Aspects of the Plunge Decision, 3 STRATEGIC 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 105, 107 (2009) (“In this conceptualization, risk is a product of un-
controllability . . . .”).  
 123. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior and Venture Surviv-
al: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 63 (2002) (arguing 
that if “a venture capitalist could adequately observe and quantify the effort level of the 
entrepreneur (and it knew the optimal effort level to be taken), it could then base the en-
trepreneur’s compensation on the amount of effort exerted”). 
 124. James C. Anderson & James A. Narus, Business Marketing: Understand What 
Customers Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 53, 54 (noting that a value model 
can demonstrate to prospective customers how the technology should be implemented); 
James C. Anderson et al., Customer Value Propositions in Business Markets, HARV. BUS. 
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neurs design for the target consumer market by envisioning the buy-
ers of the new product.125 At this stage, establishing an organization 
is a way to gather resources and express their creativity and autono-
my.126 Once a sufficient amount of planning has been conducted, en-
trepreneurs will choose the organizational form they see as the best 
fit for their venture and goals.127  
C.   Realization and Implementation  
 Innovation is distinct from invention.128 Innovation and “economic 
leadership”129 are more relevant to the economy than invention. In-
ventions are economically insignificant if they are not successfully 
delivered to the market.130 The task of the entrepreneur is to carry 
the invention into practice.131 The entrepreneurship process takes the 
previously unnoticed opportunities that entrepreneurs discovered 
and translates them into profitable exchanges.132 Production begins 
and creates new demand in the market that rapidly generates large 
revenues and sustainable profits by successfully transforming 
knowledge into economic value.133  
 Entrepreneurs need to carefully and surreptitiously develop their 
product. They need to navigate their way through this process with-
                                                                                                                  
REV., Mar. 2006, at 90, 91 (claiming that when managers construct a customer value prop-
osition, they often simply list all the benefits their offering might deliver). 
 125. See Candida G. Brush et al., From Initial Idea to Unique Advantage: The Entre-
preneurial Challenge of Constructing a Resource Base, 15 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 64, 64 
(2001) (illustrating that entrepreneurs in emerging organizations encounter many chal-
lenges in assembling resources, identifying, attracting, combining, and transforming per-
sonal resources into organizational resources).  
 126. Sean M. O’Connor, Speech, Authorship, and Inventorship: A New Approach to 
Corporate Personhood 8 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2012-03, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016568. 
 127. See Gabriele Pellegrino et al., Young Firms and Innovation: A Microeconometric 
Analysis, 23 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 329 (2012) (arguing that in-house 
R&D is linked to the propensity to introduce product innovation both in mature firms and 
young firms, but innovation intensity in young firms is mainly dependent on technical 
change); see also Howard E. Aldrich, Entrepreneurship, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY 451 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005) 
(“[E]ntrepreneurship ensures the reproduction of existing organizational populations and 
lays a foundation for the creation of new populations.”). 
 128. See THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 5.  
 129. As Schumpeter often termed entrepreneurship. SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra 
note 47, at 67. 
 130. Id.; see also SCHUMPETER, Entrepreneur, supra note 47, at 248 (noting that the 
entrepreneur may be a different person than the technical inventor).  
 131. See SCHUMPETER, Entrepreneur, supra note 47, at 248.  
 132. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, The Entrepreneur in Today’s Economy (1928), reprinted 
in THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 263. 
 133. See SCHUMPETER, Entrepreneur, supra note 47, at 241.  
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out losing control over the essence of the entrepreneurial action. 
They have to create demand that will transport that sought-after, 
supra-competitive entrepreneurial gain.134 They need to make deci-
sions while assessing market uncertainties and taking risks. The 
presence of specialists and departments may restrict entrepreneurs’ 
thought processes and key decisions.135 At this crucial point, entre-
preneurs may realize their interests have separated from that of 
their organization.136 The implementation of the entrepreneurial idea 
can result in a successful process that yields quick but substantial 
entrepreneurial gains. However, it can also result in failure, as the 
next Section reveals.  
D.   Harvesting Entrepreneurial Success or Recognizing Failure 
 Entrepreneurs create economic value by successfully pulling to-
gether a unique package of resources that exploit untapped opportu-
nities.137 They infuse economic value into the market by creatively 
securing and allocating the necessary skills and resources.138 This 
economic value is what Schumpeter called “entrepreneurial gains”—
the outcome of a successful delivery of the discovery to the market 
recognized via upsurge in the firm’s growth.139 This reflects the firm’s 
ability to convert valuable knowledge into superior economic  
performance.140  
 Following the moment when entrepreneurs realize success, they 
begin to reap “supra-competitive gains.”141 These gains are pure prof-
its emanating from the creation of new market demand and the ab-
                                                                                                                  
 134. See THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 28. 
 135. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 261, 274 (“In the large unit, in the trust or-
ganization, a phenomenon emerges that limits the importance of the entrepreneurial func-
tion, though it does not change its essence: the mechanization and bureaucratization of 
decisionmaking.”). 
 136. See id. at 276 (“The crucial point is that success of the man, and success of the 
enterprise, are not one and the same thing anymore. They are no longer different words for 
the same matter. In contrast, there is now an interest of the entrepreneur, which has to be 
distinguished from the interest of the enterprise.”).  
 137. See THE ENTREPRENEUR, supra note 39, at 16.  
 138. Id. at 28.  
 139. See SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33. 
 140. See ALEX COAD, THE GROWTH OF FIRMS: A SURVEY OF THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 77 (2009).  
 141. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33 (contending that the economy is 
dominated by a series of transitory monopolies that compete with each other on the next 
breakthrough innovation); see also PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 13-27 (1983) (stressing the importance of profit making in con-
verting an invention into an innovation and then into an essential product). 
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sence of competitors.142 What makes entrepreneurial gains uniquely 
different? Schumpeter distinguished between entrepreneurial gains 
and ordinary business profits by emphasizing the scope and timing of 
their onset.143 Entrepreneurial gains are the portion over and above a 
normal profit. They follow innovation and do not arise as a response 
to preexisting demand in the market.144 The prospect of receiving 
large rewards and personal gains leads to and maintains alertness to 
potential economically or socially significant opportunities.145 Never-
theless, as will be further discussed, entrepreneurial profits are only 
temporary premiums of successful innovation.146  
 Not all entrepreneurs succeed. The implementation stage can also 
result in entrepreneurial failure. But entrepreneurial failure is an 
important part of the entrepreneurship process. Kirzner argued that 
when there is no room for error, there is no room for opportunities for 
entrepreneurial discovery.147 Entrepreneurs often tend to be over-
optimistic about the outcomes or the availability of production 
means. They may also miscalculate the market reaction to their 
innovation. Making “correct” decisions requires more than reach-
ing an accurate mathematical answer.148 It involves a detailed as-
sessment of current and future realities and anticipating changes 
in market conditions in an uncertain environment.149  
 Entrepreneurial failure is economically and culturally valuable. It 
signals to the market what ideas do not work and provides lessons 
about new possibilities for improving the process. Entrepreneurial 
failure is a vital element of the entrepreneurship process and a cata-
lyst for growth. Entrepreneurial failure diffuses knowledge among 
entrepreneurs and points to other solutions that may lead to entre-
                                                                                                                  
 142. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33; see also Daniel F.  
Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden 
Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1844 (2007) (“[S]hort-run supra-competitive re-
turns not only allocate the scarce network resources, they signal industry participants that 
the market is in short-run disequilibrium and provide incentives to invest in additional 
network capacity.”). 
 143. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33 (“[E]ntrepreneurial gain may also 
be called a monopoly gain, since it is due to the fact that competitors only follow at a  
distance.”). 
 144. SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47, at 50.  
 145. See ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE 
THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 110-11 (1979); KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 52.  
 146. SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 272 (Entrepreneurial profit is “a profit that in 
each individual case is temporary.”); see infra Section IV.C. 
 147. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 25.  
 148. Cf. id. (discussing entrepreneurial profits).  
 149. See id. at 18-19.  
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preneurial success.150 Knowledge spillover occurs when failure is fol-
lowed by entrepreneurial actions of others.151 Learning from entre-
preneurial errors increases the competiveness of the market.152 Some 
entrepreneurs are quick to spot unnoticed opportunities, while others 
notice only those revealed by the errors of others.153 Some succeed in 
pursuing entrepreneurship while others produce waste and fail.  
 The scope of entrepreneurship, therefore, must include the possi-
bility of discovering errors.154 Studies on economic growth demon-
strate that the benefits of entrepreneurial success outweigh the 
cost of entrepreneurial failure.155 Overall, society reaps more ben-
efits from entrepreneurial action. Accordingly, entrepreneurship 
requires distinct legal considerations. The next Part reveals the 
unique elements of the entrepreneurship process that policymak-
ers should take into account when reforming the law.  
                                                                                                                  
 150. See Agarwal et al., supra note 88 (discussing spillover strategic entrepreneurship 
whereby knowledge investments by existing organizations are coupled with entrepreneuri-
al action by individuals resulting in new venture creation, heterogeneity in performance, 
and subsequent growth in industries, regions, and economies). 
 151. See Benjamin Chinitz, Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh, 51 
AM. ECON. REV. 279, 280 (1961) (arguing that the supply of entrepreneurship diffuses and 
differs across space); see also Edward L. Glaeser et al., Clusters of Entrepreneurship, 67 J. 
URB. ECON. 150, 151 (2010) (claiming that entrepreneurship is higher when fixed costs are 
lower and when there are more entrepreneurial people); Edward L. Glaeser & William R. 
Kerr, Local Industrial Conditions and Entrepreneurship: How Much of the Spatial Distri-
bution Can We Explain?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 623, 623 (2009) (finding that the 
Chinitz effect was a very strong predictor of new firm entry; the effect dominated other 
agglomeration interactions among firms or local area traits).  
 152. See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION 
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 111, 128 (1994) (arguing that learning from failure increas-
es the competiveness of the region). 
 153. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles, supra note 113, at 298 (“Considerations of this type 
entail the consequence that whenever a new production function has been set up success-
fully and the trade beholds the new thing done and its major problems solved, it becomes 
much easier for other people to do the same thing and even to improve upon it. In fact, they 
are driven to copying it if they can, and some people will do so forthwith.”).  
 154. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 51; SCHUMPETER, ESSAYS ON 
ENTREPRENEURS, INNOVATIONS, BUSINESS CYCLES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITALISM, 
supra note 33, at 207; STONEMAN, supra note 141, at 27 (discussing the fact that the mar-
gin for error is large).  
 155. See Rita Gunther McGrath, Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entre-
preneurial Failure, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13, 13 (1999) (developing a model that demon-
strates the role of entrepreneurial failure in wealth creation); Pierre Azoulay & Scott 
Shane, Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and the Failure of Young Firms, 47 MGMT. SCI. 337, 337 
(2001) (arguing that failed entrepreneurs undertake “contractual experiments” based on 
the information they possess and are rewarded for their superior information with  
survival). 
2016]  THROUGH THE LENS OF INNOVATION 977 
 
IV.   THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP PROCESS 
A.   Knowledge Intensive 
 The essence of the entrepreneurship process is discovery. Yet in 
order to discover and generate ideas, one must investigate. Entre-
preneurs are devoted to innovation in their routine operation. They 
are inclined to invest more than ordinary businesspersons on re-
search and knowledge procurement in hopes of discovering the next 
breakthrough: 
[H]uman alertness at all times furnishes agents with the propen-
sity to discover information that will be useful to them. Without 
resorting to any assumption of systematic, deliberate search, and 
without our relying on sheer luck, I postulate a continuous discov-
ery process—an entrepreneurial discovery process—that, in the 
absence of external changes in underlying conditions, fuels a ten-
dency toward equilibrium.156  
Grasping future opportunities or “seeing” the “divergence between 
the envisaged future and the realized future” requires hard work and 
creative action.157 While the future is unknown, Kirzner stated, it is 
not unimaginable.158 
 Knowledge, therefore, is the key to unlock the entrepreneurship 
process.159 The perception of new combinations or entrepreneurial 
opportunities can be realized only after conducting sufficient explora-
tion. Entrepreneurs need to engage in substantial procurement of 
knowledge.160 The payoff for this massive investment is that it may 
lead to significant entrepreneurial gains in the future. Naturally, this 
endeavor involves much uncertainty, as will be further discussed be-
low.161 Yet, by employing careful examination of current and future 
possibilities, entrepreneurs can reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
their decisions. The more knowledge entrepreneurs obtain about the 
future, the less uncertain their position is. 
                                                                                                                  
 156. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 12.  
 157. Id. at 67; see also James W. Carland et al., Differentiating Entrepreneurs from 
Small Business Owners: A Conceptualization, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 354, 358 (1984) (arguing 
that entrepreneurs make up their creative groups).  
 158. See SCHUMPETER, The Theory, supra note 47, at 67.  
 159. See Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity 
Distributions, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 773, 773 (1992) (emphasizing the nature of the distribu-
tion of firm innovation and R&D). 
 160. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 52 (“[A]n entrepreneurial element in 
action is evoked by the existence of as yet unexploited private opportunities. To act 
entrepreneurially is to identify situations overlooked until now because of error.”).  
 161. See infra Section IV.C.  
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 Nevertheless, entrepreneurs are not scholars. They do not exam-
ine current market imperfections for the sake of increasing the pre-
sent body of knowledge. They are involved in the exploration of 
“knowledge of value,” that will produce pure economic profit for its 
founder.162 Entrepreneurs are also aware that the cost of the search 
effort can be high enough to render the entire endeavor not worth-
while.163 This is part of the uncertainty entrepreneurs must face. The 
next Section discusses this distinct characteristic of the entrepre-
neurship process, namely, its ambiguous nature.  
B.   Uncertain 
 Like every acting man, the entrepreneur is always a speculator. 
He deals with the uncertain conditions of the future. His success or 
failure depends on the correctness of his anticipation of uncertain 
events.164  
 Businesspersons bear “natural” market risks.165 They make deci-
sions based on a subjective analysis of the risks and rewards that 
may result from their choices.166 These risks include, but are not lim-
ited to, preemption, miscalculation, and failure.167 According to the 
Ellsberg paradox, risk with known specific likelihoods is routinely 
preferred over risk with ambiguous probabilities—even though the 
known probability might be lower than the unknown probability.168 
Individuals always prefer definite information (albeit negative) to 
that which is indefinite or impossible to calculate.169 This is where 
entrepreneurs fundamentally differ from ordinary businesspersons.  
                                                                                                                  
 162. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 86. 
 163. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 105 (1939) (noting the temporary na-
ture of the entrepreneurial profit in the process of competition and adaptation).  
 164. VON MISES, supra note 37, at 290.  
 165. See, e.g., Kent D. Miller, A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in Inter-
national Business, 23 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 311, 312 (1992) (developing a framework that 
categorizes the risks faced by firms operating internationally).  
 166. Carolyn Y. Woo, Path Analysis of the Relationship Between Market Share, Busi-
ness-Level Conduct and Risk, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 149, 150 (1987) (evaluating the impact 
of market share on three measures of business-level risk: ROI variation, share instability, 
and the difference between growth in price and growth in cost). 
 167.  Id. 
 168. Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 
(1961).  
 169. See YAKOV BEN-HAIM, INFO-GAP DECISION THEORY: DECISIONS UNDER SEVERE 
UNCERTAINTY (2d ed. 2006); see also Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 242 (2013) (presenting a formal model of tax compliance that takes 
unknown probabilities into account). 
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 Entrepreneurs are unique in their ability to handle uncertainties 
and ambiguous probabilities.170 The entrepreneurial decision-
making process includes not only known risks but also future uncer-
tainty. The potential market for the new discovery, its possible uses, 
and its forthcoming effects, are often unnoted.171 This fog of uncer-
tainty is what distinguishes entrepreneurial decisions from calcula-
tive decisions. While the former involves assumptions regarding fu-
ture undiscovered conditions, the latter selects between several 
identified alternatives.172 As opposed to a measureable risk, uncer-
tainty refers to unknown future events with unidentified uninsura-
ble probabilities.173 
 Because these economic uncertainties are high, their rewards are 
greater and result in immense entrepreneurial profits: 
[T]he cognate idea that business decisions in a world that is full of 
uninsurable risks (“uncertainty”) will in general produce results 
that diverge more or less widely from the expected ones and thus 
lead sometimes to surplus gains and sometimes to losses, is one 
that common experience presses upon us very strongly.174 
Entrepreneurs are mindful that uncertainty makes their decisions 
far from being complete.175 Indeed some of their errors can be tracked 
to the ambiguous conditions in which they were made.176 Various op-
portunities may even remain unnoticed and undiscovered simply be-
cause of their failure to correctly pierce “the fog of uncertainty.”177 
But the speculative and creative character of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity also wins entrepreneurs large gains when they anticipate 
future market conditions correctly.178  
                                                                                                                  
 170. Cf. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 52-53.  
 171. Cf. id. at 53 (emphasizing that the entrepreneur is the bearer of market  
uncertainty).  
 172. See id.; SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 257-58. 
 173. For the differences between risk and uncertainty, see, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, 43-44 (Dover ed. 2006) (arguing that risk embodies un-
known future events with known probabilities whereas uncertainty represents unknown 
and uninsurable future events); SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 257-58. 
 174. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 257.  
 175. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 39, at 177 (“For example, rather than having a 
fifty percent chance of receiving a subsidy, entrepreneurs may prefer receiving a hundred 
percent chance – and thus absolute certainty to – receiving half of the subsidy. The ex-
pected value in both instances is the same, but the latter offers entrepreneurs certainty.”).  
 176. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 53 (“It is of course true that past er-
ror (from which, on the one view, we look to entrepreneuria l discovery to provide a 
rescue) may be attributed to the pervasive uncertainty that characterizes our world 
(and to the inevitably kaleidic changes responsible for that uncertainty.)”).  
 177. Id.  
 178. See id. at 44.  
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 Entrepreneurship, therefore, involves not only bearing, but al-
so overcoming uncertainty.179 Entrepreneurs become experts in 
lifting the veil of uncertainty.180 What makes individuals with en-
trepreneurial visions so unique is their ability to be superior evalua-
tors.181 Entrepreneurs endeavor to secure a greater correlation be-
tween their predictions and the way events actually unfold.182 
Their imagination and creativity are helpful in looking for infor-
mation and clues about the future. They develop skills in dealing 
with uncertainty and taking risks.183 Uncertainty is not easy to dif-
fuse; it is essentially a matter of knowledge. The more knowledge 
entrepreneurs have about the future, the less uncertain their predic-
tions are.184  
 The entrepreneur’s undertaking is, therefore, different from 
the typical businessperson. The businessman or executive seeks to 
portray a certain picture by computing known conditions.185 The 
entrepreneurial choice is an endeavor to identify a more “correct” 
depiction of the future market.186 Entrepreneurship involves mak-
ing a judgment about which opportunities have been left unex-
ploited by others and pursuing those opportunities.187  
[T]he lure of pure entrepreneurial profit to be grasped in step-
ping from a less accurately envisaged future to a more accurately 
envisaged one. Each step taken in moving toward a vision of the 
future that overlaps more significantly with the truth is not 
merely a step toward truth (that is, a positive entrepreneurial 
success); it is also a profitable step (that is, a step that en-
hances the value of the resources with which action is availa-
ble to be taken).188  
Accordingly, we must keep in mind the uncertain conditions that 
entrepreneurs bear and recognize entrepreneurs’ role in counter-
                                                                                                                  
 179. See Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 39, at 177-79.  
 180. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 57 (“To deal with uncertainty means to 
seek to overcome it by more accurate prescience; to discover error is merely that aspect of 
this endeavor that endows it with incentive attraction.”).  
 181. See ROBERT RONSTADT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: TEXT, CASES AND NOTES 28 (1984). 
 182. See Licht, supra note 27, at 829.  
 183. RONSTADT, supra note 181, at 28.  
 184. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 49.  
 185. Id. at 57  
 186. See id. at 58.  
 187. See RONSTADT, supra note 181, at 28 (“[V]alue must somehow be infused by the 
entrepreneur by securing and allocating the necessary skills and resources.”).  
 188. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 57.  
2016]  THROUGH THE LENS OF INNOVATION 981 
 
balancing them.189 The next Section highlights another character-
istic of the entrepreneurship process: its transient nature. 
C.   Transient 
 The first precondition for entrepreneurship is freedom to act. This 
axiom is rooted in the fact that when entrepreneurs are aware that 
others are free to join the market whenever they sense an opportuni-
ty for gains, they search for more efficient ways to persist.190 The con-
stant threat of losing one’s supra-competitive position to competing 
entrepreneurs is the driving force behind the entrepreneurship pro-
cess and the reason for its transiency.191 As soon as competitors follow 
suit, these special premiums transform into common business profits:192  
Competitors do, of course, follow suit. But before that happens, 
success brings unusual, perhaps even very large profits. To push 
through something new is the function of the entrepreneur. To fill 
this function represents the essence of the entrepreneur. The prof-
its linked to it are entrepreneurial profits properly speaking.193  
While the threat of rivalry is not unique to the entrepreneurship pro-
cess, the added presence of knowledge intensiveness creates excep-
tional concerns. Lack of awareness on the part of market partici-
pants to entrepreneurial opportunities allows the emergence of 
profit arbitrage.194 Large investments in knowledge expose these 
opportunities and begin a process of translating them into eco-
nomic value. This is temporary, though. As soon as the market 
learns about the opportunity, through the grant of intellectual prop-
erty right or otherwise, knowledge spillover begins.195  
 The temporary gains won by alert entrepreneurs attract com-
petitors to investigate the opportunity or new knowledge. Other 
market participants become motivated to learn how to reproduce 
                                                                                                                  
 189. See, e.g., KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 65 (presenting an example of how an entre-
preneur, when faced with an uncertainty may decide in their “entrepreneurial judgment” 
that the cost of a potential negative consequence is worthwhile).  
 190. See Robert M. Solow, On Macroeconomic Models of Free-Market Innovation and 
Growth, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-
MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 86, at 15, 18.  
 191. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 142, at 1844 (emphasizing the key role that short-run 
supra competitive returns play in the horizontal competition).  
 192. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles, supra note 113, at 303.  
 193. SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 271. 
 194. See Baumol, supra note 67, at 65.  
 195. Jesper Lindgaard Christensen, Knowledge Spillovers from the Patenting Process, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 179 (Birgitte Andersen ed., 2006).  
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these discoveries.196 The market immediately begins a tendency of 
unraveling these opportunities.197 Legal protection of intellectual 
products may provide entrepreneurs with a temporary “monopoly” 
position and extend the duration of their entrepreneurial gains from 
their new product.198 While the entrepreneur may hold an exclusive 
legal right over the use of the new product, the discovery or 
knowledge inherent in it becomes widely available.199 Immediately 
thereafter other competitors notice the opportunity and investi-
gate it; the profit arbitrage lessens and eventually closes.200 The 
initial entrepreneurial success is eventually consumed and with it 
the supra-competitive gains.201 Ultimately, the outcome of the free 
entrepreneurship process is the transformation of the entrepre-
neurial special premium into common business profits.202  
                                                                                                                  
 196. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 208; SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 266.  
 197. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 208-09. 
 198. SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 268 (“Where an entrepreneur has a patent, or 
some resources that is inaccessible to others, etc., he has a monopoly position.”). In this 
Article, the term “monopoly” denotes a temporary position an entrepreneurial firm holds to 
set the market price of a product due to the lack of competitive products. SCHUMPETER, 
supra note 108, at 16. It results from this firm’s entrepreneurial ability to successfully 
implement unexploited opportunities and create new demand in the market to its newly 
created product. In that position the entrepreneurial firm reaps “entrepreneurial gains” 
from its superior competitive position. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33. 
When the government approves a patent right, it provides entrepreneurs a monopoly posi-
tion on the right to use the new product. It does not prohibit others from using the entre-
preneurial opportunity or the knowledge from which the product was developed. According-
ly, the monopoly position granted through intellectual property rights is temporary be-
cause as soon as the knowledge on the opportunity is made public, it will spillover to com-
petitors that will work on improving the opportunity and creating competing products and 
uses. 
 199. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008) (debating the effectiveness of patents); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic 
Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1680 (2011) (arguing that the possibility of strategic 
knowledge spillovers may result in “private negotiations” with the strategic party “agree-
ing not to disclose and in exchange receiving from the ultimate patentee some form of fa-
vorable licensing agreement”); Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and 
Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 54-55 (1991) (examining the correlation between 
knowledge spillovers and property rights when research joint ventures are involved); Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information? 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 
564 (2012) (“[P]atent citations do provide a statistically significant signal of knowledge 
‘spillover’—i.e., that patentees are learning from roughly half the patents they cite.”).   
 200. SCHUMPETER, supra note 163 (Entrepreneurial profit is “the premium put upon 
successful innovation in capitalist society and is temporary by nature: it will vanish in the 
subsequent process of competition and adaptation.”); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE 
MICROTHEORY OF INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 101 (2010). 
 201. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33 (“[E]ntrepreneurial gain may also 
be called a monopoly gain, since it is due to the fact that competitors only follow at a  
distance.”).  
 202. See id.  
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 For that reason, the entrepreneurship process is usually brief and 
occurs at a relatively quicker pace than the typical business under-
taking. Accordingly, entrepreneurs look for rapid access to entrepre-
neurial gains by moving swiftly through the entrepreneurship pro-
cess from a discovered opportunity to a novel product or service.203 
They do so because they realize their supra-competitive position in 
the market is fleeting. It is a matter of time until their exclusive 
knowledge becomes availably known.204 Entrepreneurs can try to 
preserve that position by imposing secrecy restrictions or engaging in 
anticompetitive strategies.205 They can also rely on the lack of other 
market participants’ alertness.206 It is even possible that in certain 
industries or technologies, the market conditions and the elasticity of 
demand will allow pioneer entrepreneurs to extend the duration of 
their supra-competitive position. But entrepreneurs are never im-
mune to dissemination of their success. The market eventually  
catches on.207   
 Innovations are destined to diffuse to other market players. 
Knowledge eventually disseminates to academic circles, related in-
dustries, and the entire economy.208 Ultimately, this dissemination 
results in the forfeiture of the entrepreneur’s dominant position.209 
Once an entrepreneurial opportunity is perceived and exploited, it is 
then developed further or copied by others, so that its “novelty” is 
spread promptly.210 Hence, due to knowledge spillover, by its nature, 
entrepreneurial success is transient. It is necessary to comprehend 
this transitory nature of the entrepreneurship process in design-
ing better legal frameworks for entrepreneurs. The next Section 
illustrates the last unique characteristic of the entrepreneurship pro-
cess: its tendency toward cashing out entrepreneurial gains.  
D.   Exit Driven  
 The opportunity for a high premium and pure profit sparks poten-
tial entrepreneurs’ alertness and generates entrepreneurial discov-
                                                                                                                  
 203. Cf. Joshua Ronen, Some Insights into the Entrepreneurial Process, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 137, 148 (Joshua Ronen ed., 1983) (discussing the “continuum of  
entrepreneurship”). 
 204. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 208. 
 205. See Kelly, supra note 199, at 1681. 
 206. SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 272.  
 207. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 208; SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 266. 
 208. SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 266. 
 209. Cf. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles, supra note 113, at 305 (discussing entrepre-
neurs’ efforts to conserve profits).  
 210. Only complete domination over production resources can guarantee entrepreneurs 
permanent monopoly positions. See KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 209.  
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ery.211 Entrepreneurs who realize entrepreneurial gains seek to 
maximize them while they can. They recognize that as soon as 
their knowledge is revealed, their competitors will work on de-
throning them of their supra-competitive position.212  
 Inspired by the potential for entrepreneurial gains, other market 
players will attempt to gain access to the entrepreneur’s discovery.213 
Motivated by the potential to reap supra-competitive gains, investors 
will contract with pioneer entrepreneurs to share either their success 
or handover their knowledge.214 Entrepreneurs will often contract 
with skilled employees to exchange labor with equity share in the 
entrepreneurial success. Yet, to maximize their value, entrepreneurs 
need to remain in control and choose the right moment to cash out 
the value of their discovery.215  
 The price for the discovery fluctuates throughout the entrepre-
neurship process.216 At first, because there is much uncertainty re-
garding its market and its value, the price of the knowledge is not 
exorbitant. As entrepreneurs progress through the resourcing and 
realization stages of the process, that price increases accordingly.217 
Once entrepreneurs implement the discovery, they begin to create 
new market demand for their products.218 The moment their success 
is made public, they begin to reap supra-competitive gains. This is 
also the moment the price for their market position is the highest.219  
                                                                                                                  
 211. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 270.  
 212. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 210. 
 213. Id. at 224. 
 214. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 89, at 262, 271-75 (distinguishing innova-
tion spillovers); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 806-07, 816-21 (2009) (discussing positive externalities of  
spillovers). 
 215. Cf. Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 23-24 
(2015) (arguing that the United States already has a system of commercialization incen-
tives that does not require creating new forms of exclusive rights: direct financing for in-
ventors and entrepreneurs in the early stages of technology development seeking capital to 
fund research and operations. These are sometimes called “commercialization awards.”).  
 216. See John F. Muth, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, 29 
ECONOMETRICA 315, 315-16 (1961).  
 217. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 15 (1987); Merritt B. Fox, Securi-
ties Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1209 (2012) (noting that 
entrepreneurs get “higher prices when they sell shares in the firms they founded, and la-
bor, who are likely to enjoy higher wages in an economy where capital is allocated and used 
efficiently”); Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice to Its Private Roots, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
551, 563 (2001) (“By providing different levels of services for different prices, entrepreneurs 
can expand consumers’ options.”); James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial 
Response, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 1210 (2007) (discussing the correlation between the price 
at which the entrepreneur sells the securities and IPO liability).  
 218. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 132, at 270.  
 219. See id. at 270-71. 
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 Nevertheless, once knowledge is made public, it begins to disperse 
to other market players. It is only a matter of time before competitors 
will duplicate and diffuse this success.220 Realizing the ephemerality 
of their market position, many entrepreneurs seek to “cash out” and 
exit the process with maximum utility instead of waiting for the 
market to reflect imitation.221 After framing the entrepreneurship 
process and isolating its unique characteristics, the next Part will 
address the tension between law and entrepreneurship and suggest 
ways to consider the viewpoint of the latter.  
V.   LEGAL CLASSIFICATION FROM THE POINT  
OF VIEW OF ENTREPRENEURS 
 The key function of the entrepreneur is to implement innovations 
effectively.222 The entrepreneur “is the man who gets things done,”223 
and the “enterprise” is the conduit for implementing the entrepre-
neur’s novel ideas and discoveries.224 Entrepreneurs are people who 
possess the power to set things into motion.225 They do not act in a 
void. Law governs transactions.226 It administers exchanges between 
the entrepreneur and other market players, such as vendors, inves-
                                                                                                                  
 220. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles, supra note 113, at 294.  
 221. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2012) (“The success of venture capital depends on the ability of venture capitalists (‘VCs’) 
to exit their investments by taking the start-ups they fund public or selling them to a large 
company.”). 
 222. See SCHUMPETER, Entrepreneur, supra note 47, at 248; SCHUMPETER, The Theory, 
supra note 47, at 67.  
 223. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 266.  
 224. SCHUMPETER, Business Cycles, supra note 113, at 300 (“For actions which consist 
in carrying out innovations we reserve the term Enterprise; the individuals who carry 
them out we call Entrepreneurs.”). Some scholars view the mere act of creating a new firm 
as entrepreneurial. See Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition 
and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 297 (1977) (expanding the defini-
tion of entrepreneurship to encompass firms that earn profits by selling imperfectly substi-
tutable goods that are produced with increasing returns to scale); see also Agarwal et al., 
supra note 88, at 265 (“[I]nnovations of new entrants generate selection pressures on  
existing firms.”). 
 225. SCHUMPETER, Economic Theory, supra note 33, at 266; Lumpkin & Dess, supra 
note 99; cf. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 35 (explaining that entrepreneurs do more than 
make passive reactions and take the best course of action given the circumstances).  
 226. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937). But see 
THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Oliver E. William-
son & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993) (reviewing and refining Coase’s theory of the firm); 
Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 
1758 (1989) (providing a different theory of the firm based not on human capital structure 
but on property rights); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 120 (1988) (reviewing Coase and other theories of the firm). 
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tors, employees, and the government.227 Law imposes order and di-
rects the entrepreneurs’ ability to execute innovations. It provides 
entrepreneurs with advantages;228 it also presents them with hur-
dles.229 This Part will focus on the latter to illustrate legal causal or-
ders that do not correspond well to developments in innovation. 
 Entrepreneurs are heavily invested in the unknown. They con-
stantly make judgments about contingencies, such as cash flow prob-
lems, partner breakups, natural disasters, loss of a major customer, 
new competition, industry change, loss of key personnel, etc.230 All of 
these matters require entrepreneurs to make decisions in the shadow 
of uncertainty.231 At each stage of the transient entrepreneurship 
process, the entrepreneur faces ambiguity regarding future market 
conditions.232 In the discovery stage, the focus is on trying to predict 
future market conditions and the market reaction to the newly dis-
covered opportunity.233 In the resourcing and concept development 
stage, uncertainty about obtaining funding looms. In the realization 
stage, the entrepreneur is uncertain about whether the opportunity 
will lead to a success or a failure.234 The uncertainty that surrounds 
the new discovery differs from business risk because it stems from 
newly created market conditions and it is difficult to identify or 
measure.  
 Unpredictable, changing circumstances benefit from a stable legal 
order.235 Yet, setting strict legal rules can lead to stagnation, among 
other things, and can restrain entrepreneurs from adjusting the pro-
cess to meet unanticipated developments.236 The recent development 
                                                                                                                  
 227. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3389, 3390 (2013) (claiming that government intervention has created an investing climate 
that lets the rich get richer, while the poor get left behind). 
 228. See infra note 318.  
 229. See infra notes 244-50 and Part V.  
 230. See Lipshaw, supra note 20, at 703 (arguing that the only thing truly interesting 
about the law of entrepreneurship is more akin to the relationship of the law to property 
and liberty). But see supra Section II.B.  
 231. See supra Part III.  
 232. See supra Section III.B.-C.  
 233. KIRZNER, supra note 53, at 37. 
 234. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 64-65. 
 235. Cf. Steve H. Hanke, “Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law”: A 
Comment, 4 CATO J. 893 (1985) (noting that he agrees with Professor Rizzo’s stance on the 
proper role of a legal system, but suggesting that Professor’s Rizzo’s theory is flawed as he 
fails to recognize that a legal system should engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis). 
 236. See, e.g., Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” 
and Statutory Interpretation in the ‘Modern’ Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1317 
(1975) (arguing that certain legal constructions threaten stagnation for the courts); Rich-
ard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant? The Case Against Strict Constructionism, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23, 24-25 (arguing against strict constructionism). 
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of sharing economy is one example that highlights the dissonance 
between law and entrepreneurship. In the past few years, new Inter-
net-based platforms have been shaping a new consumer culture, low-
ering transaction costs and improving accessibility to shared goods 
and services on a previously unimaginable scale.237 Companies such 
as Uber, Zipcar, Airbnb and TaskRabbit developed new ways to allow 
greater access to services, accommodation, and transportation.238 The 
hotel, taxi, and other industries as well as many state regulators re-
sponded by demanding that the new sharing economy comply with 
existing occupancy, consumer, and taxi regulations, including entry 
controls and price-fixing.239  
 Likewise, a recent California case required the court to decide 
whether the sharing economy can fit within labor law’s classification 
of employee or independent contractor.240 The Northern District of 
California court applied the California independent contractor test 
and the “right of control” test, which are descendants of traditional 
legal doctrines that determine whether the law may hold an employ-
er liable for the tortious conduct of an employee.241 If indeed drivers 
                                                                                                                  
 237. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government 
Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 901-02 
(2015) (“The future of sharing economy regulation will be very different from its present, 
and these changes will pose profound legal, political, and ethical questions for our cities.”); 
see also Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regu-
lation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103 (2015).   
 238. Henry Ross, Ridesharing’s House of Cards: O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. 
and the Viability of Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2015) 
(describing the immense popularity of Uber that expanded into over 270 cities and count-
ing worldwide within a five-year period and has led many to anoint Uber as the most suc-
cessful Silicon Valley startup ever after just six years with a network of over 160,000 driv-
ers in the United States alone); see also Roberta A. Kaplan, Regulation and the Sharing 
Economy, N.Y. L.J. (Jul. 18, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202663656633/ 
Regulation-and-the-Sharing-economy.  
 239. See, e.g., Joshua Robertson, NRMA Accuses Taxi Lobby of Self-Interest After Com-
plaint to ACCC over UberX, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2015/aug/17/nrma-accuses-taxi-lobby-of-self-interest-after-complaint-to-accc-
over-uberx; Dominic Rushe, Airbnb Close to Securing Private Cash that Would Value Firm 
at $10bn, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2014/mar/20/airbnb-funding-talks-10bn-valuation; Marc Scribner, Ridesharing Wars: Uber, 
Regulators, and the California Compromise, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (June 6, 
2014), https://cei.org/blog/ridesharing-wars-uber-regulators-and-california-compromise.  
 240. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1152-53 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (pre-
senting plaintiffs’ allegations that Uber has made its rapid growth by denying full-
employee benefits for its drivers and using the independent contractor designation to save 
labor costs).  
 241. Id. at 1138-39; see Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee 
When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 
302 (2001) (stating that these tests are based on Blackstone’s master-servant model where 
a master was liable for an act of the servant commanded by the master or committed in the 
course of the servant’s service controlled by his master). 
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ultimately succeed in receiving employee status, the sharing economy 
model could face a serious challenge.242  
 In this sharing economy example, instead of applying existing 
classifications from old laws that fail to account for challenges pre-
sented by the new sharing economy, the law can be better designed to 
ensure regulatory objectives of safety and consumer protection.243 The 
regulator could create new experimental regulations for sharing 
economy that will allow more flexibility and further evaluation of the 
effectiveness of such regulations as more information on these ser-
vices becomes available. The new sharing economy is one of many 
examples of the dissonance between law and innovation. Different 
areas of the law such as intellectual property,244 telecommunication 
law,245 securities law,246 immigration,247 taxation,248 labor laws,249 etc. 
                                                                                                                  
 242. Ross, supra note 238, at 1433. 
 243. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 237, at 905 (sketching the future of sharing 
economy’s policy regimes by suggesting that local and state governments subsidize sharing 
firms to encourage expansion of services that produce public goods and economic redistri-
bution or contract with sharing firms to provide traditional government services).  
 244. The literature on the right balance law should preserve between overprotecting 
intellectual property, preventing abuse by “patent trolls,” and under-incentivizing research 
and development is vast. See generally, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT 
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK (2008); 
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004) (discussing bad 
patents and their legal effects); Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing 
Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137 (2015) (pointing to the fact that few 
patentee-initiated license requests result in increased innovation and suggesting the reex-
amination of the role of patent licensing in facilitating technology transfer and the devel-
opment of new technologies by the licensee); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the 
Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 182 (2008) (criticizing the lax patent 
rules that provide three-fourths of applicants patents); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Mel-
amed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013) (arguing that 
many of the problems associated with trolls are a symptom of larger flaws in the patent 
system and that those who have focused on trolls have, in effect, been missing the forest for 
the trolls); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, The Scope of IP Rights (Stanford Pub. 
Law, Working Paper No. 2660951, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2660951 (arguing 
that because of the legal separation in patent law between validity, infringement, and de-
fenses, it is often possible for a party to successfully argue that an IP right means one 
thing in one context and something very different in another and that courts won’t  
necessarily detect the problem because they are thinking of only the precise legal issue 
before them). 
 245. For instance, in recent years there is much debate in public policy and academic 
literature on “network neutrality” regulations and whether they indeed support entrepre-
neurship. Network neutrality rules forbid network operators from discriminating against 
third-party applicants, content, or portals or to exclude them from their network. See, e.g., 
Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
359 (2007); Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 52 (2007); 
Barbara Van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regula-
tion, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 336 (2007) (arguing that while network 
neutrality regulations are not without cost, their social benefits exceed these costs and 
include protecting entrepreneurs from discriminatory practices and reducing the amount of 
innovation in the markets for applications, content, and portals). But see Christopher S. 
Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005) (proposing, instead of 
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network neutrality, a “network diversity” approach that would use product differentiation 
to encourage investment and to mitigate the supply-side and demand-side scale economies 
associated with the impact of up-front, fixed costs and network economic effects).  
 246. For criticism on securities law inefficiency in providing rules to govern the entre-
preneurial finance gap through the use of crowdfunding, see generally, for example, 
DJAMCHID ASSADI, STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO SUCCESSFUL CROWDFUNDING (2016); Sean 
M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895 
(2014); Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclo-
sure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (demonstrating empirically that the current re-
gime under section 406 of the of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is unhelpful and ineffi-
cient, long on costly and burdensome disclosures, and short on demonstrable benefit); Seth 
C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2016) (criticizing securities law for getting 
Internet investor protection “completely backwards” and actually amplifying fundamental 
problems in the market for entrepreneurial finance that exposes unsophisticated investors 
to additional risk and fraud); Andrew Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 609 (2015) (discussing the dissonance between securities law and crowdfunding deals 
with the fundamental problems of entrepreneurship including uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and agency costs).  
 247. For immigration proposals that will take into account not just monetary invest-
ment in the United States, but also talent and promoting the spirit of entrepreneurship, 
see Note, Proposing a Locally Driven Entrepreneur Visa, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2403, 2404 
(2013) (proposing an entrepreneur visa allowing for entry into the United States of indi-
viduals of any skill level who commit to innovation under the sponsorship of a qualified 
local government entity); see also ANNALEE SAXENIAN, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., SILICON 
VALLEY’S NEW IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS 6-7 (1999), http://wee.ppic.org/content/pubs/ 
report/R_699ASR.pdf (focusing on the highly skilled immigrant entrepreneurs who are 
managing high-tech firms in Silicon Valley and concluding that current immigration view 
of “brain drain” and labor competition is inadequate in the case of entrepreneur immi-
grants); Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rethinking Immigration of the Highly-
Skilled and Educated in the Post-9/11 World, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 495 (2007); 
Ayelet Shachar, Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 148 (2006) (discussing the type of legal rethinking that is necessary for effective 
immigration reform regarding skilled talented individuals); Michael R. Bloomberg, Com-
mentary, A New Immigration Consensus, WALL ST. J., (May 2, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703387904576279293334248326 (suggest-
ing that “[c]reating a visa for entrepreneurs who already have funding to start their busi-
nesses will lead directly and immediately to American jobs. Visa reforms to improve tem-
porary and permanent pathways for companies to fill the current shortages of engineers, 
scientists and other specialists—whose annual visa caps are often exhausted within days of 
becoming available—will spur growth at existing U.S. companies”).  
 248. For a discussion of sharing economy and tax law, see, for example, Shu-Yi  
Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(discussing how sharing economy should be taxed, including whether existing tax laws and 
regulations are sufficient or whether new ones are needed). For the dissonance between 
social entrepreneurship and taxation, see generally, for example, Brian Galle, Social En-
terprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2025 (2013) (suggesting that social enterprise’s 
legislative popularity can best be traced to a race to the bottom among states competing to 
siphon away federal tax dollars for local businesses); see also Dana Brakman  
Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid Financial Instrument 
for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1544 (2013) (suggesting new tax solutions for 
tax law to facilitate social enterprises); Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, SE(c)(3): 
A Catalyst for Social Enterprise Crowdfunding, 90 IND. L.J. 1091 (2015).  
 249.  For example, in recent years there has been a growing debate about the use of 
“income share agreements” that enable individuals to raise funds by pledging a percentage 
of their future earnings to investors for a certain number of years. See generally Shu-Yi  
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consist of similar “friction points” with innovation.250 The next Sec-
tion will focus on two illustrations—the classifications under associa-
tion and bankruptcy laws—to demonstrate that point and suggest 
possible ways to diffuse it.  
A.   Organizing Entrepreneurship 
 Aside from incorporating predictable legal rules, an entrepreneur-
friendly legal system should also be flexible with low-cost transition 
rules. Entrepreneurs thrive when given freedom to act creatively.251 
Laws tend to limit creativity by creating rules based on causal and 
logical deduction.252 Yet, the longer entrepreneurship extends into the 
future, the higher the uncertainty surrounding it due to the inability 
to predict unforeseen events.253 Thus, the progression of entrepre-
                                                                                                                  
Oei & Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 681 (2015) (suggesting the adoption of a case-by-case approach that exam-
ines each income share agreement’s distinctive economics and draws analogies to more 
familiar financial arrangements in designing its legal treatment); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. 
Ring, The New “Human Equity” Transactions, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 266 (2014) (surveying 
some of the issues raised by these new transactions, and suggesting possible ways in which 
the law can approach their regulation). Another discrepancy can be found in labor law and 
employment rules governing “non-compete agreements.” See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT 
WANTS TO BE FREE 5 (2013) (arguing that laws governing human capital are counterpro-
ductive and stifle innovation). But see FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE 
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 5 (2015) (arguing that free 
information mobility can be disruptive and damaging to communities and local  
populations).   
 250. Cooter et al., supra note 4 (prescribing reform proposals in the areas of immigra-
tion law, technology licensing, consumption tax, local zoning rules, antitrust enforcement, 
intellectual property patent system, and corporate governance).  
 251. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
 252. See, e.g., Greg Lastowka, Innovative Copyright, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1027 
(2011) (“When we consider phenomena like blogs, wikis, and other forms of internet-based 
creativity, it seems possible that copyright law today is doing at least as much to limit cre-
ativity as it does to enable it.”); Guido Calabresi, Commentary, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 939, 942 
(1983) (claiming that innovation is discouraged when a relatively competitive market does 
not exist); Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 930, 934-35 (1983) (arguing 
that innovation is more likely to occur when risk averse manufacturers diversify their 
product mix); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the 
Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 899-901 (1983) (contending that 
entrepreneurs that develop new products may be subject to liability for older products 
manufactured before safety improvements were developed); Note, Major Operational Deci-
sions and Free Collective Bargaining: Eliminating the Mandatory/Permissive Distinction, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1971, 1983 (1989) (“By diminishing the autonomy of the parties, the 
mandatory/permissive distinction tends to stifle creativity in bargaining relationships.”).  
 253. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Re-
ducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1001 (1999) (demonstrating that lengthening the duration 
of the patent’s validity can enhance the patentee’s expected profits and thereby offset the 
innovation effects of uncertainty); cf. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: 
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 483 (2009) 
(arguing that the longer the interaction between parties, the more each party knows about 
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neurial ideas and the discovery process require the law to maintain 
leeway to adjust to changing and new circumstances.254 This is hardly 
an easy task. Organization law is one area where it is essential for 
the legal system to enact stable, predictable rules while allowing for 
costless transition from those rules in response to changes in the en-
trepreneurial environment.  
 Nevertheless, business entity-classification rules illustrate the 
mismatch between legal requirements and the entrepreneurship cul-
ture. They exemplify that while law views entity formation as a 
causal apparatus to accumulate wealth, entrepreneurship does not. 
Legal doctrine seeks order through classification by viewing the firm 
as coordinating and reducing the transaction costs of contracting.255 
Entrepreneurs form entities as conduit of their autonomy and to re-
duce uncertainty.256 This dissonance leads to the laws governing or-
ganizational choices locking entrepreneurs into inefficient legal clas-
sifications that impose high penalties when switching from one clas-
sification to another.257 
 In the past, the law provided only two forms of association—the 
partnership or the corporation.258 The divide between these classifica-
tions rested on a multi-factored “corporate resemblance test.”259 Since 
                                                                                                                  
the other, the higher the switching costs, and the greater the uncertainty and constraint on 
opportunism).  
 254. Other scholars argued similarly to allow entrepreneurs more flexibility. See Clay-
ton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1030, 1075-76 (1983) (noting liability rules are superior than property rules in permit-
ting entrepreneurs greater leeway to implement their optimistic expectations); José M. 
Padilla, What’s Wrong with a Washout?: Fiduciary Duties of the Venture Capitalist Investor 
in a Washout Financing, 1 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 269, 296 (2001) (“In order to survive and 
flourish, the management of an entrepreneurial firm needs leeway to make decisions with-
out concern for judicial intervention.”); Utset, supra note 123, at 118 (noting entrepreneurs 
need great leeway in financing due to uncertainty in their environment). 
255 See Coase, supra note 226, at 392. 
 256. The story of Madam C.J. Walker is an illustration of a minority entrepreneur who 
found such freedom in acting independently and selling hair products to an underserved 
portion of the population. See A’LELIA BUNDLES, ON HER OWN GROUND: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF MADAM C. J. WALKER 121 (2001).  
 257. See infra note 264.  
 258. In the past, entity classification as partnership or corporation was determined by 
looking at several factors such as limited liability, continuity of life, free transferability of 
interests, centralized management, associates, and objective to carry on business for joint 
profit. See Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border 
Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 96 (2002).  
 259. See Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) (defining the characteristics of an 
“association”). See generally Victor E. Fleischer, Note, “If It Looks Like a Duck”: Corporate 
Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 524 
(1996) (surveying the evolution of the corporate resemblance test).  
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then, the menu of options has somewhat expanded.260 Nowadays, 
each of the various entity classifications differs greatly, and each has 
unique governance and tax consequences.261 To achieve legal order, 
entity classifications have been designed with distinct causal  
consequences.  
 Over the years, entrepreneurs attempted to break out of those 
rules and push to change the entity status quo. In 1977, they defied 
this legal order.262 While the S corporation provided the best of both 
worlds: limited liability and pass-through taxation, it imposed many 
rules and limitations.263 Losing the S corporation status unintention-
ally was tremendously costly.264 Consequently, investors did not like 
                                                                                                                  
 260. Today, the main entity choices are a general or limited partnership, a limited lia-
bility company (“LLC”), Subchapter C Corporation (“C corporation” or “corporation”), Lim-
ited Partnership, General Partnership, and Subchapter S Corporation (“S corporation”). 
While these are the main forms, there are other entity classifications today such as the 
LLP, LLLP, and others. Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1333, 1392 (2006).  
 261. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 
103 (2005) (“Entrepreneurs long could obtain the benefit of limited liability by incorporat-
ing. What the LLC brought to the table, however, was the ability to combine limited liabil-
ity with the governance attributes of a partnership.”); Joseph Bankman, The Structure of 
Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1741 (1994) (arguing that because of tax 
advantages, using an entity with pass-through taxation is a better choice than using a 
corporation). 
 262. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 39, at 159 (“Conceived this way, entrepreneurs, 
like their colleagues in the arts and sciences, cannot help but break the rules and violate 
the codes of the status quo. That is their defining quality. The law is seen as holding them 
back and thereby preventing them – and society – from reaching their full potential.”).  
 263. S Corporations are severely limited in the ownership and equity issuance and 
therefore were typically not favored for the fast-growing entrepreneurial ventures. To be 
able to qualify as an S corporation, a small business must be a domestic corporation with 
no more than 100 shareholders and with only one class of stock measured as those with the 
same rights to distribution and liquidation proceeds. See 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012). For an 
elaborate history of Subchapter S and the birth of S corporations, see Mirit Eyal-Cohen, 
When American Small Businessmen Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Or-
ganizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 5 (2008). Shareholders must be indi-
viduals or certain trusts, estates and tax-exempt organizations. S corporation shareholders 
cannot be nonresident aliens, which restricts entrepreneurs from attaining foreign funding. 
S corporation shareholders are also subject to at-risk loss rules with respect to S corpora-
tion losses allocated to them. 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2012). 
 264. Taproot Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 133 T.C. 202, 230 
(2009), aff’d, 679 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating the high costs and complexity involved 
in converting from and to an S corporation); Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of 
the Single-Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s 
Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 898 (2009) (“It is self-
defeating to engage in a difficult and costly analysis to determine whether a venture classi-
fies as a single entity when the purpose of the classification is to simplify the analysis.”); 
Thomas M. Hayes, Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check-the-Box Treas-
ury Regulations and Their Effect of Entity Classification, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147, 
1173 (1997) (“A corporate liquidation is a costly and unexpected surprise to a taxpayer who 
otherwise thought the entity was in compliance with the reasonable basis standard.”); John 
W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: “Hey the 
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to act within the S corporation. In 1977, a group of entrepreneurs, 
seeking to enjoy limited liability and flexibility without suffering the 
harsh tax consequences of incorporation, created the Wyoming Lim-
ited Liability Company;265 in doing so, they originated the LLC con-
cept and ushered in its swift nation-wide acceptance as a mainstream 
business choice.266 The story behind the birth of the LLC is an exam-
ple of the tension between law and entrepreneurship where entre-
preneurs were able to force an unconventional change upon the law 
towards greater autonomy in organizational classifications.267 Yet, 
while the creation of the LLC brought with it incremental improve-
ment, entity classifications continue to generate confusion and ineffi-
ciency among entrepreneurs as described below. 
 1.   Tax Considerations 
 Under the entity classification tax rules, the corporate form pro-
duces double taxation.268 Two layers of tax are imposed on corporate 
earnings: one at the corporate level and another at the shareholder 
level when earnings are distributed as dividends.269 On the other 
                                                                                                                  
Stars Might Lie but the Numbers Never Do”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 921 (2000) (“In any event, 
some believe that the tax cost of exiting is not taken into account by clients at the time of 
choice of tax entity leading to surprises and perhaps recriminations upon exiting.”).  
 265. See generally Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Com-
pany, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459 (1998) (using unpublished letters and other documents, the 
author demonstrates how a group of active entrepreneurs and their attorneys were respon-
sible for inventing the first LLC statute in 1977 and winning a battle to secure partnership 
classification from the IRS).  
 266. Id. at 1461 (“In the mid-1970s, a few entrepreneurial-minded attorneys and ac-
countants representing a U.S. independent oil and gas company invented the LLC, success-
fully persuaded the Wyoming legislature in 1977 to enact the first LLC statute, and asked 
the IRS to grant the new LLC favorable partnership status.”).  
 267. See Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark, Introduction to BUSINESS TAX STORIES 9 
(Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) (“The inside story of the LLC involved the 
creative efforts of two different groups of LLC proponents harnessing the power of state 
legislatures over new business organizations in order to provide their clients the best re-
sults under the federal income tax laws.”); see also Frank M. Burke & John S. Sessions, 
The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub S and Limited Partner-
ships?, 54 J. TAX’N 232-35 (1981); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A 
Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989).  
 268. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the 
Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 169 (2002) (“This ‘double taxation’ is 
a much reviled, but stubbornly persistent feature of our current system.”).  
 269. Under 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11), “qualified” dividends are to be subject to tax at the 
same rate as long term capital gains. Congress enacted double taxation as a way to reach 
wealthy corporate shareholders that locked their assets into the corporation. See Bank, 
supra note 268, at 167 (arguing that double taxation was used by the administration as a 
tool to attack the undistributed profits tax on accumulated earnings). Over the years, pro-
posals to integrate the two layers of tax did not prevail. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating 
the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 
1 (2002) (reviewing several integration proposals and their effect on the income tax). 
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hand, pass-through taxation, available to partnerships, S corpora-
tions, and LLCs, imposes a single layer of taxation at the individual 
level. Consequently, many entrepreneurs choose these entity classifi-
cations due to their tax advantages.270 
 Nevertheless, this axiom does not affect all entrepreneurs equal-
ly.271 Double taxation mainly affects shareholders with a “money-out” 
strategy, namely owners who would like to plow back the corporate 
earnings rather than reinvesting them in discovery and expansion.272 
Double taxation may affect entrepreneurs in later stages of the firm’s 
implementation when the enterprise is more profitable; however, it 
has no effect when the firm has no taxable income. In fact, if the en-
terprise is profitable, the corporate form may still be beneficial be-
cause the firm can be used to prevent an upsurge in the entrepre-
neur’s individual marginal tax rates.273 Therefore, double taxation 
mostly affects entrepreneurs when they begin to reap entrepreneuri-
al gains or at the exit stage. 
 Aside from avoiding double taxation, the pass-through organiza-
tional form’s other advantage is the ability to transfer specific tax 
attributes to the firm’s owner. Entrepreneurs can claim the enter-
prise’s losses and immediately deduct start-up costs on their personal 
tax return.274 During the first stages of the entrepreneurship process, 
the losses incurred by entrepreneurs are often greater than their in-
come. Corporations can carry losses forward and backward, but they 
                                                                                                                  
 270. Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-Up: The Myth of 
Incorporation, 55 TAX LAW. 923, 923 (2002).  
 271. See generally Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture 
Capital Start-Ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137 (2003).  
 272. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 263, at 10. Corporations with excessive accumulated earn-
ings beyond the reasonable needs of the business are subject today to a flat twenty percent 
rate tax on accumulated taxable income. Id. Section 531 of Title 26 of the United States 
Code declares: “In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby imposed 
for each taxable year on the accumulated taxable income (as defined in section 535) of each 
corporation described in section 532, an accumulated earnings tax equal to 20 percent of 
the accumulated taxable income.”). 26 U.S.C. § 531 (2012). 
 273. For an illustration of the “money-out strategy,” see Eyal-Cohen, supra note 263,  
at 57.  
 274. Business start-up and organizational costs are generally capital expenditures. 
However, taxpayers can elect to deduct up to $5,000 of business start-up and $5,000 of 
organizational costs. These amounts are phased-out and reduced by the amount start-up or 
organizational costs exceed $50,000. Any remaining costs must be amortized. 26  
U.S.C. § 195 (2012). In his recent tax proposal, President Obama proposed to double the  
start-up expense deduction to $10,000. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS  
OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 27 (2013), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2014.pdf. 
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remain unused if no gains are present to offset them.275 Pass-through 
entities immediately benefit entrepreneurs by offsetting the enter-
prise’s losses against their individual positive incomes at the initial 
stages of the entrepreneurship process.276  
 Moreover, if losses are left unused until the realization stage of 
the entrepreneurial process, they are less valuable to traditional ven-
ture fund investors.277 Due to their tax-exempt status, institutional 
investors that are either tax-exempt organizations or foreign inves-
tors do not consider this to be a valuable option.278 Losses from earlier 
stages of the entrepreneurship process are worth less to them direct-
ly than using those losses in the corporate form to offset the future 
taxable income of the entrepreneurial enterprise.279 Additionally, 
some venture capital managers prefer the corporate form because 
they would rather not present the portfolio firms’ losses on their bal-
ance sheets to avoid the possibility of raising scrutiny about their 
performance.280  
 Loss carryover rules also restrict the use of losses when the own-
ership changes.281 Generally, a loss carryover is the ability to post-
pone the use of a capital loss to future tax years. In order to prevent 
acquiring corporations that are not economically meaningful solely 
for their tax losses, Congress added in the 1986 Act limitations on 
carryover of corporate losses.282 If the corporation substantially alters 
its ownership, it will not be able to carry over its losses and offset 
                                                                                                                  
 275. Otherwise, “[t]he newly-formed company, however, has no material source of pre-
sent or past income against which to deduct the expense.” Bankman, supra note 261,  
at 1743. 
 276. Id.  
 277. Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a 
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 801-02 (2004).  
 278. Additionally, venture capital professionals that structure entrepreneurial transac-
tions care little about utilizing losses as they do not share them personally. See Fleischer, 
supra note 271, at 151 (“Of the four major classes of venture capital investors— U.S. indi-
viduals, U.S. corporations, tax-exempt investors, and foreign investors—only a subset of 
one class, widely-held U.S. corporations with current tax liability, can use the losses fully 
and is likely to prefer the pass-through structure.”).  
 279. See Fleischer, supra note 271, at 138. 
 280. Id. at 140.  
 281. 26 U.S.C. §§ 381-382 (2012). The limitation in § 382 provides: 
 Except as otherwise provided in this section, the section 382 limitation for any post-    
change year is an amount equal to— 
(A) the value of the old loss corporation, multiplied by 
 (B) the long-term tax-exempt rate. 
 282. See H.R. REP. NO. 841-99, at 170 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4258; Daniel Q. Posin, Three Strikes Are We Out?, Transfer of Loss 
Carryovers After the 1986 Act, 7 VA. TAX REV. 697, 697 (1988).  
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them against future income freely.283 Yet, this feature may deter in-
vestors and greatly limit the ability of entrepreneurs to easily exit 
the entrepreneurship process.284  
 Another tradeoff of entity classification relates to employment 
taxes. Entrepreneurs often play several roles. In addition to being 
owners, they may also serve as directors, managers, and employees. 
In those cases, self-employment taxes must also be considered.285 As 
an employee, an entrepreneur’s salary is subject to self-employment 
taxes whether the organizational form is a partnership, sole proprie-
torship, LLC, or corporation.286 However, some of that compensation 
can be exempt from employment taxes if the firm is classified as an S 
corporation or a closely held C corporation.287 Thus, entrepreneurs 
that are owners-employees are incentivized to choose the S or C cor-
porate form and to characterize their wages as either dividends (from 
a C corporation) or capital distributions (from an S corporation).288 
Similarly, contributing capital and incurring debt at the enterprise 
level are treated differently in each organizational form.289 Indeed, 
studies show that when entry-level entrepreneurs are making entity
                                                                                                                  
 283. There are also certain tax rules prohibiting many pass-through investment enti-
ties from capturing the full benefit of losses. One way to solve these issues may be creating 
a corporate entity as a subsidiary holding company of the venture capital fund or tax-
exempt investors. This type of solution involves planning from both parties and incurring 
additional transaction costs. See Fleischer, supra note 271, at 170 n.134. 
 284. See Lee, supra note 264, at 903-07 (arguing that taxation under Subchapter C is 
more advantageous for a small private C Corporation owned by high-income shareholders 
than taxation under Subchapter S or Subchapter K).  
 285. See Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN.  
L. & POL’Y REV. 127, 134 (2009) (discussing the S Corporation self-employed tax shelter).  
 286. See Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do It, 62 TAX 
LAW 749, 784 (2009) (comparing the LLC and partnership regimes on this point); Sheryl 
Stratton, ABA/AICPA Have Legislative Fix for LLC Self-Employment Tax Problem, 84 TAX 
NOTES 351 (1999) (noting S Corporations can treat owners of the business as employees 
and pay salaries for their labor).  
 287. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2) (2012).  
 288. See Satterthwaite, Entry-Level Entrepreneurs and the Choice-of-Entity Challenge, 
10 PITT. TAX. REV. 139, 158 (2013).  
 289. For a sole proprietor, there is no business capital structure for tax purposes apart 
from the balance sheet of the owner. Increases in partnership debt are considered contribu-
tions of money by the partners and decreases are considered distributions of money up to 
the partner’s basis in the partnership. These rules apply similarly to LLCs that elected  
to be taxed as partnerships. In order to allow losses to pass through to the shareholders,  
S corporations’ debt to its shareholder is added to the shareholder’s basis. 26  
U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2012). C corporations are more flexible in the sense that they allow 
multiple classes of stock and debt contribution of capital can be tax-free under certain con-
ditions. 26 U.S.C. § 351 (2012). In addition, payments of interest on debt are deductible to 
the corporation while loan repayment is a non-taxable event. 
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classification decisions, these tax considerations create biases in fa-
vor of certain classifications, even though those forms may not be 
their ideal choice.290  
 2.   Non-Tax Considerations 
 Limited liability is an important tool for lowering uncertainty and 
decreasing transaction costs. If entrepreneurs are personally liable 
for the results of the entrepreneurship process, their decision-making 
process is encumbered by negative externalities.291 Yet, each of the 
different organizational classifications provides different degrees of 
protection from joint or several liability for the enterprise’s action 
and obligations to other parties.292 Corporate officers and directors 
owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care to the corporation and its 
shareholders.293 Accordingly, serial entrepreneurs that implement 
                                                                                                                  
 290. See generally Emily Satterthwaite, supra note 288 (arguing that for tax reasons 
Subchapter S of the Tax Code has important effects on entrepreneurs’ entity choices). 
 291. Throughout the entrepreneurship process, entrepreneurs act in a state of uncer-
tainty and try to predict future market conditions. Entrepreneurs tend to make their deci-
sions independently if they know that their financial accountability is limited.  
 292. Sole proprietors are personally liable for debts incurred from their business activi-
ty. General partners have unlimited joint and several liability for partnership obligations; 
each general partner serves as an agent for the partnership and can bind the other part-
ners. Unless they agree otherwise, members or managers of an LLC or shareholders in a 
corporation are only liable to the extent of the capital they have contributed (unless the 
limited partner participates in the management and control of the entity or receives an 
improper distribution). Members of an LLC may be found liable for prohibited distribu-
tions. The only way to hold them liable for their actions in the firm is through “piercing the 
veil” of incorporation. Otherwise, the corporation, LLC, and S corporation are separate 
legal entities and only the entity’s assets are liable for its debts. Unless otherwise provided 
in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for 
the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason 
of his own acts or conduct. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (A.B.A. 2002). See generally 
Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democra-
cy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 155 (1992) (holding that the legislative history of 
limited liability was to encourage entrepreneurs to start and grow new businesses); see also 
Bainbridge, supra note 261, at 514-34 (contending that veil piercing is unjustified and ad-
vocating for its abolishment); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability 
and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (“[Veil piercing seems to happen 
freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, 
Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of 
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 864 (1997) (arguing that a corporation does 
not have a mind of its own and by definition is a fictitious entity); Robert B. Thompson, The 
Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 
(1997) (arguing that veil piercing usually occurs in close corporations with fewer than ten 
shareholders.). 
 293. Fiduciary duties are the duties of loyalty that agents owe their principals under 
the fiduciary relationship. These duties result from “the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and con-
sent by the other to so act.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
Fiduciary duty issues often arise when entrepreneurs play different roles in the enterprise, 
such as employee-managers or directors. In an LLC, these duties are somewhat more flexi-
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several opportunities in various firms at once run into fiduciary is-
sues.294 Once the enterprise is formed, LLCs are more flexible, have 
fewer administrative reporting requirements, and managers can set 
up their management structures as they please.295  
 Obtaining funding for an entrepreneurial enterprise is not an easy 
task. This type of funding is done in the shadow of uncertainty. Yet, 
entrepreneurs who wish to exit using venture funding have to either 
initially choose an organizational form that benefits venture funders 
or bear the costs of converting to one at a later stage.296 Nowadays, 
conventional wisdom holds that venture capital firms generally do 
not favor investing in partnerships or LLCs.297 They prefer the less 
complex and more predictable corporate laws to partnership and LLC 
state laws.298 They prefer “safe” default rules for management and 
governance rather than relying on sophisticated drafting of manage-
ment agreements.299  
                                                                                                                  
ble and they can be customized in the operating agreement. See Frank H.  
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993).  
 294. Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 1559. On entrepreneurial opportunism and 
fiduciary consequences, see generally Kenneth B. Davis Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary 
Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1986) (examining 
private arrangements and incentives between fiduciary and principal designed to deal with 
the problems created by corporate opportunism); Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opt-
ing Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291 
(1992) (discussing whether judges should supply expansive implied fiduciary duties to dis-
cipline a stronger party’s opportunistic behavior in a cooperative venture.); Brian J. 
Broughman, Investor Opportunism and Governance in Venture Capital, Companion to Ven-
ture Capital (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1364133 (discuss-
ing VC opportunism in regards to CEO replacement, later-round financing, and VC exit). 
 295. Unless otherwise specified in an operating agreement, LLC rules do not require 
carrying annual meetings, board of directors meetings, shareholders meetings, corporate 
minutes, and so on. 
 296.  See Mitchell L. Engler, Progressive Consumption Taxes, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 85 
(2005) (“[E]ntity taxation of partnerships would trigger significant transition costs as the 
full tax liability would shift from the partners to the partnership.”); Larry E.  
Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 79, 105-07 (2001).  
 297. STEPHEN F. REED & ESTHER S. BARRON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP LAW 67 (2013); 
Fleischer, supra note 271, at 138.   
 298. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 389 (2003) (arguing 
that, throughout history, corporate form is more useful due to its restrictions on capital 
withdrawals). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-In?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 
523, 524-25 (2006) (arguing that the transaction costs associated with lock-in and its avail-
ability to the partnership form call into question the true value of lock-in). 
 299. These laws have accumulated a substantial amount of case law, and they are 
much more predictable and reliable. See Deborah A. DeMott, Agency and the Unincorpo-
rated Firm: Reflections on Design on the Same Plane of Interest, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
595, 611 (1997) (arguing that sophisticated investors are not likely to experiment with 
organizational innovations that carry uncertain consequences). Unlike LLC case law, the 
rights of shareholders of C corporations—and their officers’ duties—are well established in 
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 Moreover, many venture capital firms are organized as limited 
partnerships. They have rules prohibiting their managers from in-
vesting in flow-through entities due to the tax implications for their 
limited partners.300 Other institutional investors, such as tax-exempt 
organizations or foreign investors, prefer the corporate form so as to 
avoid the tax consequences of receiving unrelated business income.301 
Exiting the entrepreneurship process using a public offering also en-
tails converting to the corporate form and incurring conversion 
costs.302 Entrepreneurs who anticipate public funding are forced to 
choose between incorporating in the early phases of the entrepre-
neurship process or bearing the cost of converting at a later stage.303 
The chosen organizational classification, thus, signals to the market 
the entrepreneur’s exit strategy.304  
 Lastly, during the entrepreneurship process, entrepreneurs often 
make use of employee stock options to fund their labor force.305 Em-
ployee stock option programs serve as a way to attract qualified em-
                                                                                                                  
corporate case law. Thus, corporations have a better reputation for serving the needs of the 
entrepreneurship process. See Bankman, supra note 261, at 1766 (noting the nonmonetary 
benefits of the corporate form in reference to investment goals); Fleischer, supra note 271, 
at 163 (“For the venture capital professionals and entrepreneurs who negotiate the deal 
structure, however, gains are taxed more favorably if the C corp. structure is used.”); Cal-
vin H. Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development Deduc-
tions?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 29, 91 (2009) (claiming that venture capital funds form a separate 
C corporation for each venture that they support within their portfolio of diverse ventures); 
Lee, supra note 264, at 921 (“A few significant contexts, such as business reasons, idiosyn-
cratic investor preferences, or a near-term goal of going public, may induce selection of a C 
Corporation, even when initial losses are anticipated, foregoing the income tax savings of a 
passthrough entity.”).  
 300. See Mann et al., supra note 277.  
 301. Fleischer, supra note 271, at 137-38.  
 302. Id. (arguing that while follow-throughs may be more tax efficient due to the trans-
action costs, information problems, reputational concerns, and adverse accounting treat-
ment prevent deal planners from using the theoretically tax-favorable form). But see Gold-
berg, supra note 270, at 937 (contending that converting from a partnership or an LLC to a 
C corporation is not too costly).  
 303. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 296, at 106. But see Usha Rodrigues & Mike 
Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 
869 (2013) (describing the special purpose acquisition corporation (“SPAC”) a uniquely 
public form of private equity fund).  
 304. Choosing the corporate form allows greater liquidity and possibilities for exiting. 
Selecting pass-through organizational forms may signal to the market a desire for control 
and longer anticipated entrepreneurial progression. 
 305. See S. Amdt. 1668 2(a) to S. 783, 103rd Cong. (1994) (enacted) (expressing the 
importance of employee stock options to businesses in the high growth sectors that rely 
heavily on human capital); Doug Collom, Vesting of Founders’ Stock: Beyond the Basics, 
THE ENTREPRENEUR’S REPORT: PRIVATE COMPANY FINANCING TRENDS 9 (2008); Erica Gor-
ga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: To-
wards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1150 (2007) (argu-
ing that high-tech firms perceive employee stock options as a critical mechanism for retain-
ing knowledgeable employees).  
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ployees by offering them a combination of lower compensation and 
future equity rights in the entrepreneurial success.306 These pro-
grams personally motivate workers to maximize their labor efforts 
and collaborate with management to make sure the organization 
prospers.307 Entrepreneurs have more ready access to these types of 
programs in the corporate form than in the other organizational 
forms.308  
 3.   Possible Solutions  
 Current organizational frameworks are not in sync with the na-
ture and characteristics of the entrepreneurship process.309 Entre-
preneurs must contend with too many legal considerations and 
tradeoffs when they are trying to establish enterprises to implement 
their discoveries. The flow-through legal classification may be benefi-
cial in passing on the major research and development expenses and 
losses to the entrepreneur in the discovery and resourcing stages.310 
                                                                                                                  
 306. See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 161 (2d ed. 
2004) (“Managers and critical employees within a [start-up] firm receive a substantial frac-
tion of their compensation in the form of equity or options. This tends to align the incen-
tives of managers and investors.”); Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding 
Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 874, 880 (2003) (“An overwhelming percentage of management's compensation de-
pends on firm performance. The potential for dramatic appreciation in the value of stock 
and options thus offsets low salaries.”).  
 307. See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organ-
izational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 903 (2010) (“The 
performance incentive is further heightened by requiring the entrepreneur and other 
members of management to accept a staged vesting requirement on some or all of their 
stock or stock options.”); James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What 
Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (2009) (claiming that investors commonly use perfor-
mance-based compensation, such as stock options that have the effect of exerting effort 
instead of shirking them); Ibrahim, supra note 221, at 30 (“VCs instill high-powered per-
formance incentives in entrepreneurs and employees by compensating them with start-up 
stock and stock options.”).  
 308. Such as the C corporation. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 421-423 (2012). Employees who own 
equity in a partnership are treated as partners and are subject to increasing tax liability 
issues. While lawyers of partnerships and LLCs can devise profit interests agreements and 
create different classes of profit participation, they are usually more complex and costly. 
These increased transaction costs may turn away capable employees from joining the en-
terprise. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 296, at 106. 
 309. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 296, at 106; see also Mitchell F. Crusto, 
Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A Limited Liability Sole Proprietorship Act 
(LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 381 (2001) (arguing that to encourage would-be entre-
preneurs to create businesses, the law should enact a limited liability statute designed for 
the sole proprietor); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1630 (1991) (“While limited liability of close corporation shareholders 
may encourage a certain amount of undue risk, unlimited liability would probably result in 
excessive risk aversion by entrepreneurs, particularly given the inability of such investors 
to diversify.”); Mann et al., supra note 277.  
 310. See generally Goldberg, supra note 270. 
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However, in later stages, this structure no longer remains attractive 
to foreign or non-profit institutional investors that have limitations 
on creating unrelated business income.311 Each state governs the dif-
ferent entity choices in its region, so entrepreneurs must also master 
different state law rules.312 These legal classifications impose un-
necessary informational and transactional costs on entry-level en-
trepreneurs and lock them in inefficient routes.313  
 Due to the unique role that it plays in the economy, entrepreneur-
ship should not be confined to a specific legal framework; rather, it 
should be permitted to evolve into its optimal form without paying 
exorbitant transition costs.314 In 1996, Treasury attempted such 
change by issuing new regulations known as “check-the-box” to sim-
plify the manner in which the tax system determines how business 
entities are taxed.315 These regulations allow taxpayers greater flexi-
bility in electing between pass-through or corporate tax classification 
irrespective of their non-tax designation.316 Nevertheless, while 
check-the-box regulations improved tax simplicity they did not lower 
the tax costs of conversion and were criticized for their failure to 
amend the multi-regime system for taxing businesses.317  
                                                                                                                  
 311. See Fleischer, supra note 271, at 137-38.  
 312. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine 
to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 555 (2007) (applying veil piercing doctrine to 
LLC’s and LLP’s).  
 313. See id. at 554; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 
92 n.378 (1996) (suggesting that as an alternative to insurance, entrepreneurs could 
demonstrate financial responsibility either by posting a bond or by proving their financial 
condition in the same amount as the limits of the liability insurance policy for which it 
would substitute); Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1981 (2015).  
 314. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Taxation of Partnerships 
and Other Pass-Through Entities, Report on the Proposed “Check-the-Box” Regulations on 
Entity Classification, 51 RECORD 663 (1996) (critiquing check-the-box regulation and entity 
classification transition rules, default rules, and treatment of changes in classification by 
election). 
 315. The new regulation’s biggest change was providing LLCs that have more than one 
member a default classification as a partnership but an option to elect to be taxed as a 
corporation. See generally Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 451 (2009) (criticizing the entity classification regime twelve years after the prom-
ulgation of the regulation).  
 316. On March 29, 1995, the Department of the Treasury issued Notice 95-141 an-
nouncing its intent to simplify the tax entity classification rules. Two years later, on De-
cember 17, 1996, the Treasury finalized 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701, also known as the “check-
the-box” regulations, by which eligible entities can indicate their desired tax treatment 
simply by checking a box. See Hayes, supra note 264, at 1148.  
 317. Field, supra note 315, at 451 (arguing that the regulations lack a coherent set of 
limitations, which undermines the goals behind the provision of the election); cf. Steven A. 
Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election, and the Future 
of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 450-51 (2005) (“By permitting taxpayers to 
choose, for instance, to treat a limited liability company as a corporation, as an alternative 
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 While the law contains some beneficial rules to embolden entre-
preneurship, it is far from attaining a full-fledged entrepreneur-
friendly climate.318 Despite some progress, current transition rules 
between various organizational classifications place high costs and 
limit the autonomy of the entrepreneur.319 These rules widen the dis-
connect between legal entity choice and the nature of the entrepre-
neurship process. They restrict entrepreneurs from freely departing 
the entrepreneurship process and reaping entrepreneurial gains.  
 Consider, for example, an entrepreneur whose discovery process 
incurs significantly more research and development costs than ini-
tially expected. In order to offset these expenses at the individual 
level until the discovery begins to pay off the entrepreneur may want 
to adjust out of the corporation form. Yet, current check-the-box regu-
lations restrict the entrepreneur’s ability to change entity classifica-
tion more than once in a five-year period.320 De facto, these rules 
place a serious hurdle on the entrepreneur’s ability to adjust the le-
gal framework to the fast-changing nature of the entrepreneurial 
process. Additionally, once the entrepreneur changes the enterprise 
from a corporation to a different entity classification, the corporation 
is deemed to have liquidated, which could entail recognition of signif-
icant gains.321 Finally, should the entrepreneur receive an opportuni-
ty to merge or exit the entrepreneurial process, loss carryover rules 
restrict the amount of pre-change losses that can be used to offset 
post-change gains to a fraction of the value of the old loss corpora-
tion.322 This may place yet another obstacle in the entrepreneur’s way 
to implementing and realizing entrepreneurial success or failure.  
                                                                                                                  
to the standard partnership treatment, the election spares taxpayers from whatever trans-
actional complexity . . . .”).  
 318. For example, tax law provides for research and development tax credit, see 26 
U.S.C. § 41, deductibility of start-up costs, see 26 U.S.C. § 195, etc. See Michael J.  
Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, and the 
Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 351-52 (2013) (de-
scribing three important tax incentives that have been adopted in the United States and 
Europe to support and stimulate technological innovation in an effort to enhance economic 
growth: (1) tax credits and super deductions for R&D, (2) patent (or innovation) boxes—the 
latest European fashion—and (3) special deductions or lower income tax rates for “ad-
vanced manufacturing.”).  
 319. See Satterthwaite, supra note 290, at 158 (“[C]onverting to a different type of enti-
ty once the business is up and running and has going-concern value as an S Corporation is 
complicated and can be costly.”); see also supra note 263 and accompanying text.   
 320. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (as amended in 2005); see also Field, supra note 
315, at 503-04 (explaining that the rule was placed for administrability of entity classifica-
tion and anti-abuse function).  
 321. The liquidation of a corporation requires recognition of gains and losses at both 
the corporate level and the shareholder level. 26 U.S.C. §§ 331, 336 (2012).  
 322. 26 U.S.C. § 382(b) (2012). 
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 Finding solutions that balance the nature of entrepreneurship 
with other legal systemic values such as administrability, simplicity, 
and prevention of gaming is not an easy task.323 Naturally, under a 
purely elective system without limits, entities could abuse the legal 
system to try to benefit from certain tax and non-tax attributes.324 
Yet, a flexible and adaptable legal system could incorporate more lat-
itude as innovation progresses.  
 In order to allow more mobility at minimal costs, legal institutions 
governing the entity choices should make judicious determinations 
about the consequences of altering selections.325 The Internal Reve-
nue Service should create a special high-tech division, similar to the 
large and mid-size or tax-exempt business divisions with agents that 
possess experience working with entrepreneurs and are guided to 
think like them.326 More concretely, costless transitioning more than 
once within the current 5-years window could be allowed unless the 
entrepreneur fails to prove that the transaction has a bona fide  
rather than avoidance purpose.327 Similarly, just like in the case of 
                                                                                                                  
 323. See Field, supra note 315, at 506. 
 324. Id.  
 325. For example, when faced with a check-the-box application to change entity choice, 
the IRS does not consider particular facts and circumstances in making the determination 
and is limited to time limitation rules. See generally 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2 (2015); § 301.7701-
3; IRS Form 8832.  
 326. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 1.1.24.1 (20016), https://www.irs.gov/ 
irm/part1/irm_01-001-024.html#d0e10. 
 327. For example, corporate tax rules allow assumption of liabilities unless there is an 
apparent tax avoidance purpose:  
(b) Tax avoidance purpose  
(1) In general If, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and 
the circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for the assumption 
was made, it appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with re-
spect to the assumption described in subsection (a)—  
 (A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange, or 
 (B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose, 
then such assumption (in the total amount of the liability assumed pursu-
ant to such exchange) shall, for purposes of section 351 or 361 (as the case 
may be), be considered as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange. 
(2) Burden of proof  
In any suit or proceeding where the burden is on the taxpayer to prove such 
assumption is not to be treated as money received by the taxpayer, such 
burden shall not be considered as sustained unless the taxpayer sustains 
such burden by the clear preponderance of the evidence. 
26 U.S.C. § 357(b) (2012).  
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corporate reorganization, loss carryover can be allowed if a substan-
tial part of the investment and business activity of the acquired cor-
poration (rather than ownership) is preserved.328  
 Undoubtedly, these proposals will not resolve the distortionary 
effects of organizing entrepreneurship entirely. They may even intro-
duce new costs, gaming opportunities, and inefficiencies. One such 
inefficiency could be the difficulty in distinguishing entrepreneurial 
firms from other business entities. While this endeavor is challeng-
ing, it is not unfeasible.329 The proposals above have the potential of 
lowering transition costs and empowering entrepreneurs to match 
organizational choices with the fluctuating nature of their discov-
ery.330 They can be instrumental in narrowing the instances of  
entrepreneurs having to strike a compromise between financial au-
tonomy, taxation, and governance issues when choosing their vessel 
for innovation.331  
 Policymakers that seek to foster entrepreneurship should consider 
further experimentation with opportunities to promote a culture of 
freedom and creativity.332 Additional research should be done on 
ways to achieve costless entity switching in a manner that will not 
change ex-ante entrepreneurs’ organizational considerations. Seeing 
the issue of organizational choice through the lens of entrepreneurs 
involves incorporating organizational liberty and realizing that the 
entrepreneurial environment is highly invested (from its preliminary 
                                                                                                                  
 328. For example, corporate reorganization rules afford tax-free treatment under the 
“continuity of business enterprise” requirement if the principal purpose of the transaction 
was not to reduce tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 368 (Supp. II 2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d). See 
generally Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ 
Stock, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1085, 1098 (2012); Daniel Q. Posin, A Case Study in Income Tax 
Complexity: The Type A Reorganization, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 627, 644 n.112 (1986) (“A corpora-
tion’s historic business is generally the business it has conducted most recently but is not 
one the corporation has entered into as part of the plan of reorganization.”). A similar rule 
can be found in corporate distributions of stock and securities under § 355(b) which re-
quires, among other things, that the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation 
is engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business. 
26 U.S.C. § 355(b) (Supp. II 2014).  
 329. See, e.g., Mirit Eyal-Cohen, supra note 51 (utilizing Schumpeterian economic theo-
ry to create a new legal model that measures entrepreneurial qualities).  
 330. For example, if they are in the computer software industry and will expect to be 
financed by angle investors or a few individuals, the pass-through form will be beneficial. If 
they are in the pharmaceutical industry and require institutional investors, the C Corpora-
tion form will be ideal for them.  
 331. See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 261, at 1741 (arguing that because of tax ad-
vantages, using an entity with pass-through taxation is a better choice than using a  
corporation). 
 332. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Creators, Innovators, and Appropriation Mechanisms, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 973, 975 (2015) (arguing that policymakers should not allow inter-
ested players to narrow the debate to the appropriation mechanisms of only one stakehold-
er group in creative innovation ecosystems). 
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stages) in obtaining knowledge, is uncertain, and aims to quickly de-
part after attaining its rewards. The next Section demonstrates simi-
lar concerns pertaining to legal classifications in entrepreneurial 
failure. 
B.   Entrepreneurial Default 
 The risk of failure and its adverse legal consequences constantly 
threaten businesspeople.333 Yet, due to the unusually high invest-
ment in knowledge and discovery, entrepreneurial failure can result 
in even more massive (positive and negative) consequences. Because 
of the uncertainty inherent in the entrepreneurship process, entre-
preneurs cannot accurately anticipate possible personal injuries or 
contractual damages or to calculate the probabilities of those occur-
rences.334 When a new product creates new market demand and new 
customers, its failure can cause the firm to default and it can also 
result in numerous lawsuits and colossal damage payments.335 Law, 
thus, plays a vital part in resolving entrepreneurial default.  
 Failure is as important to the entrepreneurship process as suc-
cess.336 Entrepreneurial failure diffuses knowledge and delivers posi-
tive spillovers to other entrepreneurs, markets, and industries.337 It 
can limit the outcomes of that failure so as not to discourage entre-
preneurs from assuming new risks or from entering the market. En-
trepreneurs tend to make decisions based on the merits of the inno-
vation independently when the scope of their financial accountability 
is limited.338 Indeed, studies have indicated net negative effects of 
                                                                                                                  
 333. See generally René M. Stulz, Six Ways Companies Mismanage Risk, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar. 2009, https://hbr.org/2009/03/six-ways-companies-mismanage-risk (arguing that 
the failure of conventional risk-management contributed greatly to the current global fi-
nancial crisis); Nassim N. Taleb et al., The Six Mistakes Executives Make in Risk Manage-
ment, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2009, https://hbr.org/2009/10/the-six-mistakes-executives-
make-in-risk-management (“Because of the internet and globalization, the world has be-
come a complex system, made up of a tangled web of relationships and other interdepend-
ent factors.”).  
 334. See KNIGHT, supra note 25, at 43-45.  
 335. James T. O’Reilly, Entrepreneurs and Regulators: Internet Technology, Agency 
Estoppel, and the Balance of Trust, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 69 (2000) (“True 
innovations like novel drugs carry unforeseen consequences that only emerge after market 
entry. If the innovator’s widget breaks so easily that dozens of users bring products liabil-
ity claims, the entrepreneur’s capital will be exhausted in defense of liability lawsuits or 
suits for economic damages from the failure of the product.”) (footnote omitted). 
 336. See supra Section III.D.  
 337. See supra notes 86-89, 114.  
 338. See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the 
Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1317 (2007) (“Limited liability therefore 
encourages entrepreneurial activity by attempting to shift the risk of corporate insolvency 
from shareholders to the business’s creditors.”); Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing 
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imposing a financial responsibility requirement on entrepreneurs.339 
They have also demonstrated that previous business failures make it 
extremely difficult for entrepreneurs to receive new funding.340 There-
fore, bankruptcy law plays an important role in reducing uncertainty 
and in facilitating an exit in the entrepreneurship process.341  
 1.   Bankruptcy Classifications  
 Bankruptcy law provides procedures for individuals and business 
debtors to reach discharge of debt342 and a fresh economic start.343 In 
the entrepreneurial context, bankruptcy procedures offer an oppor-
tunity for debt relief and to pursue a different route to implement 
ideas. Yet, the concept of bankruptcy’s fresh start, as a theoretical 
underpinning does not transpire in the entrepreneurial reality344 and 
may even lock entrepreneurs into their failed enterprises.345  
 Today, bankruptcy laws are divided into two main categories: 
Chapter 7 (basic liquidation) or Chapter 11 (rehabilitation or reor-
ganization).346 Chapter 7 provides relatively quick and straightfor-
                                                                                                                  
of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. L. REV. 148, 155-
56 (1992) (stating that limited liability was rooted to encourage small and impecunious 
entrepreneurs to start and grow new businesses); Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 1536 
(“[L]imited liability and asset partitioning—reduce the costs of entrepreneurial action and 
failure, thus emboldening entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities.”). See generally Bain-
bridge, supra note 261, at 106 (discussing corporate opportunism in several stages of VC 
financing).  
 339. While entrepreneurs should internalize some risk, these studies focused on the 
overall societal effect of restraining entrepreneurship. See Seung-Hyun Lee et al., Entre-
preneurship and the Barrier to Exit: How Does an Entrepreneur-Friendly Bankruptcy Law 
Affect Entrepreneurship Development at a Societal Level? (Small Bus. Admin., Working 
Paper No. SBAHQ-06-M-0536, 2008), http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7372321.pdf; see also 
LoPucki, supra note 313, at 88-89. 
 340. See PHILIP J. ADELMAN & ALAN M. MARKS, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: FINANCE 
FOR SMALL BUSINESS 162-63 (2d ed. 2001) (demonstrating the difficulties for these busi-
nesses in establishing a line of credit to protect against cash flow deficiencies). 
 341. Id.  
 342. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 30-61 (6th ed. 2014) 
(providing a comprehensive introduction to the basic principles of bankruptcy law).  
 343. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1059 (1987); see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: 
REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 91 (1997) (“[D]ebtors should have an ‘opportunity 
to begin anew’ or a ‘chance to start over.’ ”). 
 344. See, e.g., John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2981 (1999) (criticizing the rules governing corpo-
rate bankruptcy in the entrepreneurial context).  
 345. See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 69-72 (2006) (arguing that their empirical findings challenge the 
fresh start as the theoretical underpinning for consumer bankruptcy relief).  
 346. Aside from these, Chapter 13 provides for payment plan rehabilitation for sole 
proprietors, Chapter 9 provides for municipal bankruptcy, Chapter 12 provides for rehabil-
itation for family farmers and fishermen; and Chapter 15 is designed for international 
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ward liquidation procedures for individuals and businesses and it is 
often referred to as “personal bankruptcy.”347 In Chapter 7 cases a 
court-appointed trustee liquidates the debtor’s property, distributes 
the proceeds to the creditors, and discharges the debtor from most (or 
all) of the debt.348 Here, the search for a new business opportunity is 
encouraged by a fresh start that is not conditioned upon keeping the 
old business intact.349 Chapter 11 is used primarily by corporate 
debtors for financial rehabilitation.350 Debtors negotiate a reorganiza-
tion plan with their creditors while continuing their operations as 
going concern and retaining their assets.351  
 Entrepreneurial failure does not entirely fit within these two 
bankruptcy classifications. In practice, entrepreneurs often face per-
sonal liability for their enterprises’ liabilities.352 Corporate bankrupt-
cy is essentially a sorting mechanism that aims to identify if a firm 
has greater value as a going-concern rather than as its separate, liq-
uidated parts.353 It seeks to maximize the firm’s social value by allow-
ing it to continue to operate.354 It provides rules and procedures to 
                                                                                                                  
debtors. See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 769-79 (1993); JAMES J. 
WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 171 (3d ed. 1996).  
 347. As of 2005, Chapter 7 discharge is available only once every eight-year period. See 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23. See generally Hansmann et al., supra note 260, at 1403 n.245 (2006) (claim-
ing the act strengthened the position of creditors at the expense of consumer debtors, in 
large part by shifting individual cases from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13).  
 348. Unless the debtor is found guilty of certain types of prohibited behaviors such as 
concealing records.  
 349. Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Busi-
ness Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2319 (2005).  
 350. Chapter 11 is the point of entry for many companies that cannot file under chap-
ter 7. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A 
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 605-06 (2009) (providing data to defuse 
criticism on Chapter 11 procedures as having a relatively low success rate and endless 
delay).  
 351. In some cases, the plan of reorganization involves a massive sale of assets. See 
Matthew A. Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Prelim-
inary Injunction Standard for Objections to § 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2012) 
(indicating the importance of the quick sale of all or a part of the entity’s assets under 
Chapter 11 reorganization cases).   
 352. See Jeremy Berkowitz & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and Small Firms’ Access 
to Credit, 35 RAND J. ECON. 69, 71 (2004). While much of the bankruptcy theory has fo-
cused on corporate bankruptcy, personal bankruptcy is more relevant to sole-proprietor 
entrepreneurs, some of whose business debts are secured by personal assets. See generally 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) (analyzing the 
role of bankruptcy law in collective action and debt collection).  
 353. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2313.  
 354. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 673, 685-93 (2003) (demonstrating the effect of assets and business relationships on 
going-concern values).  
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better coordinate those going-concern values and their economic real-
ities. Yet, in the context of entrepreneurship, it creates a deficit. 
 Realizing the transient nature of the process, entrepreneurs tend 
to be over-optimistic and may begin production and expansion before 
completing the research and discovery stage. In that case, society 
may benefit from rehabilitating the entrepreneurial enterprise and 
rebooting the process at a slower pace.355 Nevertheless, in the typical 
entrepreneurial bankruptcy scenario, errors often relate to uncer-
tainty in discovering or creating opportunities. When there are few 
capital assets and most of the inherent value of an entrepreneurial 
business is built in accumulated knowledge and human capital, it is 
useless to concentrate on the entity’s tangible property and its capital 
structure.356 The innovative firm rarely has value outside of the busi-
ness. This often makes little sense to view the enterprise as a going-
concern.357 Attempts to reshuffle the assets and debts of the entre-
preneurial firm in bankruptcy will yield tangential, not significant 
results. Thus, in some instances bankruptcy law overly penalizes en-
trepreneurial firms for their errors, and may discourage them from 
pursuing inherently high-risk opportunities even if they offer a po-
tentially high return.358 
 2.   Unraveling Flexibility  
 While many entrepreneurial businesses fail, the entrepreneurship 
culture of self-employment and independence motivates entrepre-
neurs to start anew.359 Empirical studies have shown that serial en-
trepreneurs launch new businesses at a rate much higher than the 
                                                                                                                  
 355. Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2318 (“The socially optimal strategy for the 
entrepreneur is to shed the excess capacity and retreat to the core business that she once 
ran successfully.”).  
 356. See id. at 2315; see also Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An 
Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & ECON. 
381, 382 (2007).  
 357. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2311 (“It is therefore a mistake to ask 
whether the corporate entity that is the subject of the bankruptcy case is worth saving.”).  
 358. See Seung-Hyun Lee et al., How Do Bankruptcy Laws Affect Entrepreneurship 
Development Around the World?, 26 J. BUS. VENTURING 505, 506-07 (2011).  
 359. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2338 (“Among businesses that were shut 
down in bankruptcy, the owner-operators went on to found another business in 50% of the 
cases. In about 38% of the cases, the new business was similar to the one that was liqui-
dated in bankruptcy.”); Saras D. Sarasvathy et al., Failing Firms and Successful Entrepre-
neurs: Serial Entrepreneurship as a Temporal Portfolio, 40 SMALL BUS. ECON. 417 (2013) 
(concluding that at least one-third of new firms are founded by entrepreneurs who have 
started businesses before); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistics for Owners of Respondent 
Firms by Whether the Owner Previously Owned a Business or Had Been Self-Employed 
 by Gender, Ethnicity, Race, and Veteran Status for the U.S. (2007), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=SBO_2007
_00CSCBO06&prodType=table. 
2016]  THROUGH THE LENS OF INNOVATION 1009 
 
general population.360 They rapidly recover from their failure to en-
gage in other entrepreneurial ventures.361 In the majority of case 
studies, entrepreneurs express interest in remaining entrepreneurs 
after completing their bankruptcy procedures.362 This inclination for 
freedom and creativity fuels the entrepreneurship process whether 
the ultimate outcome is exit through failure or success.  
 The current chapter 11 bankruptcy classification distorts this in-
clination by encouraging entrepreneurs to tie their human capital to 
their failed venture.363 It incentivizes entrepreneurs to reorganize 
and rehabilitate their business, which are the aims of corporate 
bankruptcy, but not necessarily entrepreneurial bankruptcy. Unrav-
eling the distinct reasons entrepreneurs enter into bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is the first step to bridging this gap. Entrepreneurs may ini-
tiate bankruptcy procedures for different reasons. Oftentimes, they 
seek to benefit from the automatic stay, to attain temporary liquidity, 
to realize an opportunity to renegotiate debts, and to obtain greater 
bargaining position with some of their creditors that can only be ac-
complished by filing for bankruptcy.364 They do not necessarily wish 
to continue to pursue the original opportunity. Once initiated, these 
causal classifications of bankruptcy laws often lock entrepreneurs 
                                                                                                                  
 360. Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2339 (stating that eighty-five percent of the 
owner-operators in the authors’ sample are serial entrepreneurs).  
 361. See Rafael Efrat, Minority Entrepreneurs in Bankruptcy, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY  
L. & POL’Y 95 (2008); see also Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Val-
ue of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161, 161-62 (2007) (arguing that a “fresh-start” 
bankruptcy policy provides greater social surplus due to greater debt relief than creditors 
would have approved voluntarily); Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 365, 366-67 (2006) (indicating a shift in public attitudes begin-
ning in the 1960’s towards individuals filing for personal bankruptcy in the United States); 
Frank M. Fossen, Personal Bankruptcy Law, Wealth, and Entrepreneurship—Evidence 
from the Introduction of a “Fresh Start” Policy, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 269 (2014) (demon-
strating that the “insurance effect” of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law exceeds 
the interest effect and encourages less wealthy individuals to enter into entrepreneurship). 
But see Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2349 (claiming that most businesses enter 
bankruptcy not to avoid inefficiencies cured by Chapter 11, but rather to exploit potential 
inefficiencies created by the Code, including the entrepreneur’s enhanced bargaining power 
in disputes with a creditor, landlord, or some other third party).  
 362. See Rafael Efrat, The Rise & Fall of Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study of Indi-
vidual Bankruptcy Petitioners in Israel, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 163, 165 (2002).  
 363. Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2343 (“If given the chance to take advantage 
of Chapter 11 in this manner, [entrepreneurs] would be acting rationally, just as those who 
remain in a rent-controlled apartment that is too small or too far from work are acting 
rationally.”).  
 364. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor 
Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 116 n.42 (2004); cf. Kenneth M. Ayotte, Bankrupt-
cy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161, 179-80 
(2007) (stating that entrepreneurs can use bankruptcy laws to obtain efficient levels of debt 
forgiveness).  
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into their failure entity by incentivizing them to reorganize and in-
terfere with their effort to find a better match for their talents.365   
 Viewing bankruptcy theory through the lens of innovation should 
focus the analysis on the entrepreneurs (whether owners or employ-
ees of the bankrupt entity) rather than on the enterprise. The court 
should emphasize the value of entrepreneurial knowledge instead of 
physical capital and generic tools and equipment.366 Acknowledging 
the transient and exit motive nature of the entrepreneurship process 
should promote a swift resolution and easy transfer of knowledge and 
intellectual capital to a new venture.367 Bankruptcy law should target 
the way in which entrepreneurial assets can best be implemented ra-
ther than assessing their separate value or contribution to the failed 
going-concern surplus.368 
 Studies have demonstrated that bankruptcy laws have positive 
and negative effects on entrepreneurship.369 They may be improved 
and made more entrepreneur-friendly without compromising the in-
tegrity of the system as a whole. Specialized fast-track bankruptcy 
proceedings for entrepreneurial entities governed by judges that pos-
sess scientific knowledge may achieve better results in sorting out 
failed from potential opportunities. In the latter cases, it may en-
courage more channels for debt negotiations and dispute resolutions 
                                                                                                                  
 365. Much like basis-shifting tax rules encourage ownership lock-in of appreciating 
assets. See David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 72 (2000). 
 366. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2331-32 (“The only significant asset is 
the human capital of the entrepreneur, and it can be readily deployed in different busi-
nesses. Similarly, the relationships with suppliers, customers, and workers are tied to the 
entrepreneur, not to the business.”) (footnote omitted).  
 367. Id. at 2311 (“The owner-operator’s human capital is fully portable and is used to 
start a string of businesses over her lifetime. She moves from business to business—often 
in the same industry—until finding a good match between her human capital and a partic-
ular business model.”). Serial entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs who “specialize in starting 
innovative companies, and they often voluntarily leave to others the development and on-
going management of the firm.” D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduci-
ary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1474 (2002); see also Mark Gimein, Silicon Valley’s Serial 
Entrepreneurs: Why Wait for the IPO?, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at 269; Paul Gompers et 
al., Skill vs. Luck in Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital: Evidence from Serial Entre-
preneurs 12-13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12592, 2006). 
 368. For example, a patent is worth much less as a separate asset than it is as part of 
an assembly line implementation process. For the difference between financial and eco-
nomic distress, see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
580-83 (1998). 
 369. See Lee et al., supra note 358, at 505 (“[W]e find that lenient, entrepreneur-
friendly bankruptcy laws are significantly correlated with the level of entrepreneurship.”); 
Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838, 843-44 (N.D. 2007) (criticizing entrepreneurs using 
a corporate shell); Morrissey, supra note 312, at 533 (calling for entrepreneurial liability in 
cases of fraud and injustice). 
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to afford entrepreneurs “breathing space.”370 In the other cases, it 
may accelerate dissolution to allow entrepreneurs to proceed to their 
next discovery.  
 Bankruptcy judges can benefit from using “expert entrepreneur 
appointees” as restructuring advisers in recommending the court 
whether to develop a turnaround plan for the company, seek oppor-
tunities for merger, provide additional time to reassess the entrepre-
neurial opportunity, or dissolve the entity. While these proposals 
may be more costly and difficult to administer they hold value in 
providing separate procedures for entrepreneurial defaults and expe-
diting resolution of the entrepreneurial process.371 A legal system 
with a reputation of embracing greater opportunities for either lee-
way or a fast exit upon failure could attract more entrepreneurship 
and generate larger social surplus.372  
VI.   CONCLUSION  
“Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.” 
—Roscoe Pound, 1967373 
 A core tension exists between law and entrepreneurship.374 Entre-
preneurial vision is costless.375  Nevertheless, the legal system 
plays a major role in encouraging but also inhibiting the entre-
preneurship process by placing costly hurdles in its path.376 Cur-
rent legal structures demonstrate that focusing on maintaining sta-
bility and predictability by enforcing legal order and causality is too 
narrow and may create significant distortions and misguide entre-
preneurs. Reducing particular business circumstance to strict legal 
                                                                                                                  
 370. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 349, at 2315 n.22.  
 371. See Seung-Hyun Lee et al., Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship Development: 
A Real Options Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 257, 257 (2007) (“We suggest that a more 
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designed for family farmers or family fishermen—allows breathing space and rapid fresh 
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preneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 161, 162 (2007). See general-
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such a balance “is the problem of the ages”); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF 
LEGAL THOUGHT 43-59 (1996) (emphasizing the tension between rules and discretion). 
 375.  KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, supra note 74, at 27.  
 376. Justin W. Evans & Anthony L. Gabel, Legal Competitive Advantage and Legal 
Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary International Framework, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
333, 334-35 (2014).  
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classifications fails to fully encompass the spirit of entrepreneurship; 
thus, a change in academic, legal, and political debates about entre-
preneurship is in order.  
 Law and entrepreneurship can coexist under more balanced con-
ventions. Legal institutions such as courts and agencies can play a 
more significant role in facilitating the entrepreneurship process and 
ensuring an environment in which entrepreneurs can successfully 
act.377 Judges should examine legal standards while considering the 
fact that entrepreneurs bear unusually high uncertainty, they make 
large investments in knowledge in a process that is usually short and 
exit-driven. Adjudicating through the lens of entrepreneurship in-
cludes embracing the notion legal classifications and determination 
hold the power to either hamper the entrepreneurial spirit or to en-
courage a more active and vibrant entrepreneurial environment.378  
 Despite the recent negative spotlight on corporate inversions and 
global competition on the situs of firms, surprisingly little attention 
has been paid to the positive ways that our legal system could seize 
as a strategy for reinforcing our economy.379 This Article attempted to 
fill that void and shed light on this new force (entrepreneurship) that 
has fascinated us over the last decade due to its ability to enrich our 
lives.380 It also hopes to instigate future empirical scholarship on the 
ways in which law affects entrepreneurship. Although this Article 
focused on the positive externalities of entrepreneurship, there is a 
need to further assess the negative externalities of law on entrepre-
neurship. A forthcoming paper will portray the nature of the distri-
bution of regulatory costs on entrepreneurial firms. It will unveil dis-
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criminatory effects of the regulatory action on startup companies that 
lack economies of scale, scope, and age and their unregulated  
affiliates.381 
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